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In this thesis we consider four problems from the general area of mathematical finance. 
In Chapter 2 we consider how to price a moving average up-and-out call option in the 
Black-Scholes model. This option differs from an up-and-out call option in that knock­
out occurs when a moving average of the price process reaches the barrier. We study 
two such options which differ in the precise conditions for knock-out. Approximate 
prices are obtained for these options in terms of the prices of up-and-out call options.
In Chapter 3 we present an optimal investment/consumption problem. Agents de­
cide how to divide their wealth between investment in an asset which pays stochastic 
dividends, and consumption. They aim to maximise the utility of their respective 
consumption streams. The focus of our work is on how a large agent behaves in this 
environment. The model can also be interpreted in the context of a corporate takeover.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the study of a Markov process. This Markov process arises 
from a model describing meetings and interactions between a group of agents. We find 
that the Markov process is close, in some sense, to a dynamical system. Analysis of the 
dynamical system helps us to understand the behaviour of the Markov process which 
will typically exist on a large state space.
In the final chapter we model the activity of a firm with an issue of convertible debt. 
The value of the firm’s assets is taken as the fundamental exogenous stochastic process. 
We find the conditions under which the firm should default, and the conditions under 
which a bondholder should convert. This behaviour forms a Nash equilibrium. We find 
that the bondholders do not all convert at the same time. We establish the share and 
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The remaining chapters of this thesis are each concerned with a problem in mathemat­
ical finance. The setting for the first problem, that of Chapter 2, is the Black-Scholes 
model of a share price. We aim to price a derivative — the moving average barrier 
option — within this model. Black h  Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) set the foun­
dations of arbitrage pricing theory by finding a formula for the price of a European call 
option. They show how to hedge the option with a self-financing portfolio and hence 
determine the price.
Much of option pricing theory is based on two key results (see Harrison & Kreps 
(1979) and Harrison h  Pliska (1981)). The first is that the absence of arbitrage is 
equivalent to the existence of an equivalent probability measure under which discounted 
prices are martingales. We shall refer to this equivalent probability measure as a risk- 
neutral probability. The second is that if markets are complete then this equivalent 
probability measure is unique. These results enable us to express the price of any option 
in a complete market as an expectation in the risk-neutral measure. An introduction 
to arbitrage pricing theory and the Black-Scholes model can be found in Musiela & 
Rutkowski (1998).
Several authors have studied barrier options since Merton (1973) found the price of 
a European down-and-out call option. Rubinstein & Reiner (1991) give closed-form 
expressions for the prices of knock-in and knock-out barrier options, with barriers either 
above or below the initial share price. Broadie et al. (1997) consider barrier options
7
that can only knock-in or knock-out at discretely sampled times, and Carr (1995) looks 
at options where the barrier feature only becomes active after an initial protection 
period, and options which depend on whether a second asset reaches a barrier. The 
particular type of barrier option we study in Chapter 2 knocks out if a moving average 
of the share price reaches the barrier. The material of this chapter appears in Heritage 
(2002).
In Chapter 3 we consider a consumption/investment model. Early work of this kind 
includes Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971). In these papers there is a single 
agent who divides his wealth between investment in assets with stochastic returns, and 
consumption. The aim is to find the optimal policy for such an agent under various 
assumptions about the utility function and about the form of the returns on the assets. 
More recently, Karatzas et al (1987) look at a consumption/investment model under 
a wide class of asset price processes and utility functions.
In all the above models prices are determined exogenously. Karatzas et al (1990) 
study a multi-agent consumption/investment model in which prices are determined 
endogenously; the emphasis of their work is on establishing the existence and uniqueness 
of an equilibrium in such a setting. We consider a model with endogenously determined 
prices where there are two groups of agents, perhaps a large homogeneous pool of price- 
takers, and a small group of ‘large’ investors who behave differently. The aim of our 
study is to determine optimal behaviour for the large agents. Our model can also be 
interpreted as describing a corporate takeover. This chapter appears in Heritage & 
Rogers (2002).
The material in Chapter 4 is motivated by ‘search’ models that have appeared in the 
economics literature (references are given in section 4.1). In these models there is 
no centralised market in which agents trade, with buyers and sellers automatically 
matched. Instead pairs of agents meet according to a random matching process. A 
trade may occur between two agents when they meet. One reason as to why these 
models have interested economists is that they provide a natural role for fiat money1. 
Without fiat money, two agents can only trade if there is a ‘double co-incidence of wants’ 
— each agent must be prepared to buy the good that the other is selling. Barter can 
then occur. The presence of fiat money can improve the equilibrium (in some sense) 
as trade can occur when there is only a single co-incidence of wants.
*Fiat money is money that has no intrinsic value; its use is as a medium of exchange.
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We abstract from the economics and study a Markov process which corresponds to 
the random matching of pairs agents, with state changes possibly occurring at these 
meetings.
In the final chapter we consider a firm with an issue of convertible bonds. We take 
a structural approach in the model, that is the fundamental exogenous process is the 
value of the firm’s assets. The convertible bonds are considered as contingent claims 
on the firm’s assets. The structural approach was used by Merton (1974) in mod­
elling corporate debt. Our aim is to find a Nash equilibrium between the bondholders 
(who choose when/whether to convert) and the firm (which chooses when/whether to 
default).
Ingersoll (1977) and Brennan & Schwartz (1977), amongst others, have studied con­
vertible bonds in structural models. One way in which our approach differs is in the 
treatment of default. We use methods similar to those in Leland (1994) and Leland 
& Toft (1996) to endogenously find the optimal time for the firm to default. We also 
allow the bondholders to convert at different times. As a consequence of this we find 




Moving Average Barrier Options
2.1 Introduction
The option that we study here is a variant of the up-and-out barrier option, which we 
shall henceforth refer to as the standard up-and-out barrier option.
The moving average barrier option is defined as follows. The time between purchase 
and expiry [0, T] is divided into intervals A\  =  [0, <J], A 2 = [£, 2J], . . .  , A n  = [T — 6, T] 
of length S = T /N .  The option knocks out if the average of the asset price over any of 
these intervals exceeds the barrier, otherwise the payoff is equal to that of a call option. 
Typically N  will range from 20 upwards.
The main result of this chapter is to find an approximation for the price of a moving 
average barrier option in terms of the price of the corresponding standard barrier 
option. This is done in the next section. The approximation is justified by simulation 
in section 2.3. In section 2.4 we consider an alternative moving average barrier option 
where knock-out occurs if the average of the asset price over any interval of length S 
between purchase and expiry exceeds the barrier.
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2.2 Approxim ating the option price
In the risk-neutral probability, the asset price at time t  is given by the process
St =  So exp (oWt +  (r -  cr2/2) t) .
Here r is the riskless interest rate and a is the volatility of the asset. Throughout Wt 
will denote a standard Brownian motion. For notational convenience we shall write
M =  r - - a
and
X t =  aWt +  /it.
The moving average option has payoff
So (eXT — k)+ 1 < sup i  f  eXudu < eb >
[j<N 0 JAj J
where T  is the expiry time, Sok is the strike price and Soeb is the barrier. Therefore
the time-0 price of the option in our model is
E e rTS0 (eXT — k)+ 1 / sup i  [  eXudu < ebl  
[j<iv o JAj J
(2 .1)
We may assume without loss of generality that So = 1 and T  = 1. The first of these 
assumptions is trivial; the second is valid as (2.1) can be expressed as a function of the 
variables (r/cr2, cr2T, k, 8, b). It is therefore sufficient to consider the expression
p = p{8,6, At, r,a) = E e r (e 1 — k y  1 < sup
I j<N
du < eb
Using Girsanov’s theorem we can make a transformation of the risk-neutral probability 
measure P  to an equivalent one P° in which the process Xt  becomes driftless. We then 
have
M\e T (eXl — k) + 1 < sup i  f  eXudu < eb 
[ j<N 0 JAj
11
where the Cameron-Martin martingale Mt is defined by
Mt =  ex p ( _ ^ ( _ g . t)
Let ^(6) denote the time-0 price of a standard up-and-out barrier option with barrier 
eb. In our model the price of an option is the expected value of the payoff, appropriately 
discounted. Thus
*(&) =  E  [e- r g(X, 6)]
=  E ° [ M l e - rg(X,b)] ,
where g(X, b) is the time-1 payoff of an option with log price path X  and barrier eb. An 
explicit formula for ^(6) is known (see Conze k. Viswanathan (1991) for example) and 
is reproduced in appendix A. We now aim to relate the price of the moving average 
barrier option to ^ ( b). Firstly we define t to be the time at which the supremum of 
X t in the interval [0,1] is attained, and Aj to be the interval in which t lies. We make 
two assumptions which relate t  and Ay
Al A
A2 The distribution of t within the interval Aj is uniform.
We define the random variable r  by
We can interpret r  as the difference between X i  and an average of the process Xt  in 
the interval that t  lies. Thus r  depends only on the shape of Xt  in the interval Aj and 
not on the values of Xt  in this interval. We make the following approximation:
A3 g(X, b) and r  are independent in the risk-neutral probability.
Appendix B shows in more detail why this is a reasonable approximation to make. 
This enables us to write our approximation p to the price of the moving average barrier
j  is the interval over which the integral -  f  eXudu is maximised.
o J a .
option in the following way:
p = E° [Mie- Tg(X, b + r)]
=  B ° [* (6  +  t )]
=  $ ( 6 )  + E° [t ] $ '(& ) +  [ r 2] +  . . .
Our objective now is to calculate E°[t). We make one further assumption here.
(2.3)
A4 The process X* is like a three-dimensional Bessel process either side of the supre- 
mum. More precisely, cr-1 (Xj — Xf+t) and a -1 (Xj — X$_t) are equal in distri­
bution to three-dimensional Bessel processes.
Rogers & Satchell (1991) perform a similar analysis of a Brownian path near the supre- 
mum. Now we have enough information to approximate E°  [r]. We Taylor expand the 
exponential and then the logarithm.
E°[t] = E°
=  E l
= E i
=  E l
— log ^  J  eXu Xidu 
- l o g j V  1 +  ( x u -  X{) + \ { x u -  X {)2 + . . . d u j  
- l o g f l  + ^ J a (Xu ~ X i) d u + ^  (Xu - X i)2du + . . .  
- \ [ ( X u ~  X {) du -  i  J  (Xu -  X-)-
(2.4)
du — ..
+  \ ( l J A ( X u ~ X i) d U + h j A +• • •




- 5 / „ « . - * >
1 f 1 1 p s-  /  (X-t -  X u)du +  -  /  (Xf -  X u)du
d  J ( 3 - 1 ) 5  0  J t
iL
*5 /  r t  r t
=  E° I I I j  crRudu +  J  aR'udu 1 dt
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where Ru and R'u axe independent standard three-dimensional Bessel processes begin­
ning at zero. Here we have applied assumption A2 that t  is uniformly distributed in 
the interval Aj  as well as assumption A4. Changing variables in these integrals yields
E c - i / du = 2El
a V ~6 fo (I R u d u ) dt
and so this term is of order y/S. The other terms in (2.5) are at least of order 5 and so 
if we define
T) =  2as:Rudu ) dt
then we have
£°[t] = aVSE°[i,] + 0(S).
We will discard the order 6 terms. An application of Jensen’s inequality to (2.4) shows 
that
£ ° [ t ]  <  o y /S E P f o ) .
Therefore discarding the order S terms produces an overestimate. The density function 
for Ry, (see Revuz & Yor (1991) for example) is
fu{y) = 2y2 exp /  (2ttu3) 1/2 .
By evaluating the relevant integrals we find that





Our analysis indicates that E° [r2] is of order 6 and so we only consider the first two 
terms in (2.3). Therefore our approximation for the price of the moving average barrier 
option is
32
P =  V(b) + ay/5 15\/27r 
V(b) + 0 .8 5 1 0 7 7 ^ ^ (6 ) . (2 .6)
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2.3 Simulating the option
To test the accuracy of (2.6) I used Monte Carlo simulation with a control variate 
technique. We outline the method used and then present the details concerning the 
probability distributions of some of the quantities that are needed.
First the Brownian path Xt  was evaluated at the endpoints of the intervals. The prob­
ability that a standard barrier option knocks out given these points on the Brownian 
path can then be calculated. The details of this axe given below. Thus we can find the 
expected payoff of a standard barrier option given the asset price at the endpoints of 
the intervals. Conditional on the same set of endpoints of the intervals on the Brownian 
path, for each interval we can find the probability that the average value of the log asset 
price exceeds the barrier. Again, the details of this are given below. This enables us to 
approximate the expected payoff of the moving average barrier option given the asset 
price at the endpoints of the intervals. Taking averages of the expected discounted 
payoffs over a large number of simulated Brownian paths gives Monte Carlo estimates 
for the standard barrier option price and the moving average barrier option price. As 
an exact price for the standard barrier option is known in closed form, the price of the 
moving average barrier option can be corrected by the error in the standard barrier 
option price to give the final estimate. For each set of parameter values, the Monte 
Carlo estimate is based on 105 simulations.
If the Brownian path Xt  exceeds the barrier at one of the endpoints then we know that 
the standard barrier option will knock out. Otherwise, for each interval Aj ,  we calculate 
the probability that the Brownian path exceeds the barrier inside this interval. The law 
of X t in the interval Aj  conditioned upon its values at the endpoints of that interval 
is that of a Brownian bridge. There are several equivalent definitions of a Brownian 
bridge (see Rogers &; Williams, 2000, theorem IV.40.3); we will use the following:
X { j - l ) 6+t  =  X ( j-1)5  +  (X jS ~  X { j - l ) s )  S +CT 5)  B  ’ * G I0 ’ ^
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where B(t) denotes a standard Brownian motion. Therefore
P  sup X {j_1)5+t > b
\ 0  <t<6
= p  (X]S -  x ^ s) f+* ~ £H A) >6 -  x « - » )  ■
If we make the transformation of variables
8tu =
S - t
we find that this probability becomes
P  (sup (XjS -  x 0 _1)s) +  ^ B ( u )  > b -
= P  ( sup -(6  -  Xjs)u  +  a8B(u) > 8(b — J
\0<u /
( b - X ^ 1)s) ( b - X jS)
= exp I —2
a2 8
The final equality is a standard result concerning the law of the supremum of a Brow­
nian motion with negative drift.
We also need to find the distribution of the average of the path Xt  over an interval 
given its value at the endpoints. Define Y  to be this random variable.
r = J [  + ( * *  -  *0-D *) ( ^ ) )  dt-
As Y  is the integral of a linear function of a Brownian motion, it will have the normal 
distribution. Calculating the mean is straightforward — we take the expectation inside 
the integral:
dt
~  2  +  X i&)
as the expectation inside the integral is zero. To calculate the variance of Y , we first 
remove the deterministic part and then apply standard properties of variance to deduce
16
that







8 — t dt
We take the expectation inside the double integral. Using






v - r ( y )  LI
■if! a
- i - s 8s A St8 — s 8 — t dsdt
=  2 - 1 — -  ) s dsdt
a2 8 
~12‘
Now that we know the distribution of Y,  for each interval we can calculate the proba­
bility that the average of the log asset price exceeds the barrier. Hence we can approx­
imate the expected payoff of a moving average barrier option given the asset price at 
the endpoints of the intervals.
Simulating the average value of the log asset price as opposed to the log of the average 
value of the asset price introduces an error. Jensen’s inequality gives the sign of the 
error:
H \ s L eX, d t .
> \L X fdt
17








The expected value of the first term in (2.7) is a28/12 which is small for realistic 
parameter values.
Monte Carlo simulation gives estimates for the prices of the options. We would like to 
know how accurate these estimates are. We introduce some temporary notation to find 
the variance of the Monte Carlo estimates: let Zi denote the discounted payoff for the 
ith  simulated Brownian path, for i = 1 , . . . ,  M, with M  denoting the total number of 
simulations run. The Monte Carlo price, MCP, is given by
M
M C P  =
z=1
As the Zi are independent and identically distributed,
Var(MCP) = — Var(Zx).
An unbiased estimator s2z  for Var(Zi)  is
4  = M — 1
M  i /  M
E
2= 1  \  2 = 1
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and so an estimator s2MCP for the variance of the Monte Carlo estimate is
s m c p  ~
1
M ( M  -  1)
M 1 /  M  \
1=1 \z= 1 /
This is likely to be an overestimate of the variance as it does not take into account the 
control variate used. Assuming that the Monte Carlo estimate is normally distributed 
then allows us to find confidence intervals for the Monte Carlo price.
Figures 2-1 to 2-4 show the ratio of the simulated price over the price obtained using 
(2.6). As the interest rate (figure 2-1) and the strike (figure 2-2) vary, the ratio stays 
between 0.98 and 1.00 for nearly each point plotted. As the barrier varies (figure 2-3) 
the ratio is between 0.98 and 1.00 except for low barriers. The range of the ratio is 
similar when the volatility varies (figure 2-4) except that the ratio is higher when the 
volatility is high and N  is low. A possible reason why the ratio is slightly below one 
for most choices of parameter values is assumption Al. It is equivalent to assuming 
that the moving average barrier option knocks out if and only if it knocks out in the 
interval in which t lies. Thus we underestimate the probability of knock-out and so 
overestimate the option price, causing the ratio to be below one. With choices of 
parameter values such as very low barriers or very high volatilities the approximation 
becomes less reliable. In both these cases the probability that the payoff (for both the 
standard barrier option and the moving average barrier option) is zero, either because 
the option knocks out or because the asset value at expiry is less than the strike, is 
close to one. Therefore the price of both options would be small. The approximation 
is also less accurate when N  is small, corresponding to <5 being large. Most of the 
approximations that we made were based around S being small and so this effect is to 
be expected. Finally, the 95% confidence interval for the ratio of any point in figures 
2-1 to 2-4 is at most ±0.01. That is, the 95% confidence interval for the ratio is at 
most the interval with boundaries 0.01 either side of the point. Observe that these 
confidence intervals are consistent with the general roughness of the plots.
2.4 An alternative moving average barrier option
Now we consider an alternative moving average barrier option which knocks out if the 










40 Interest rate, rN  =  l/<5
Figure 2-1: Ratio of approximate price to simulated price as the interest rate and 6 














Figure 2-2: Ratio of approximate price to simulated price as the strike and S vary. 











N  =  1/6
Figure 2-3: Ratio of approximate price to simulated price as the barrier and S vary. 










N  =  l / 60.1
Volatility, a
Figure 2-4: Ratio of approximate price to simulated price as the volatility and 5 vary. 
Other parameter values are b = 0.3, k = 0.9, r = 0.06.
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payoff of this option is
(eXl — k)+ 1 I sup i  f  eXudu < eb 1.
[ 5 < t < l O J t - 6  )
The payoff, and hence the price of the option, lies between that of the standard barrier 
option and our first moving average barrier option. We can derive an approximation 
for the price of this option with a method analogous to that used in section 2.2. The 
random variable r  would be replaced by
t ' = X f — sup log ( \  [  eXudu \ .
6<t <  l  \ 8 J t - s  J
(2 .8 )
Let t* denote the time that the supremum in (2.8) is achieved. A simple differentiation 
shows that
X** =
and so we may view Xt  as a Brownian bridge over the interval [t* — 6, t*]. The assump­
tions made in section 2.2 need to be modified for this option.
A l' The maximising interval [t* — S, t*] contains the time t.
A2' g(X, b) and r' are independent in the risk-neutral probability
We are able to derive an expression for the approximate price p' which corresponds to 
equation (2.3).
p' = $(6) +  E°  [t'] *'(&) +  i E°  [ t '2] $"(6) +  . . .
Now we calculate an approximation for E°[t’] in the same way as in section 2.2.
iog(U.Vx“' ^du
= E l ’l /*’ 17 I (X{ - X u)du  
° J r - s
+  0 (6). (2.9)
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Vervaat (1979) proved the following relationship between a Brownian excursion and a 
Brownian bridge.
* V s z t/i = d x * - x » ‘ o < t < r - i  
' \  x-t -  x-t_s+t r - t < t < s
Here =a denotes equality in distribution, and Zu is a standard scaled Brownian excur­
sion of length 1. A consequence of this result is that the distribution of the integral in 
(2.9) is the same as the integral of a Brownian excursion.
' +  0 (6)£°[r'] =  E ° \ ] J  °V 6ZU/Sdu 
= B° L v s  Zudu +  0 (6).
The density function for Zt (see Ito &; McKean (1996) for example) is 
f t (y) = 2y2e x p ( -  / (2nt3 (1 - 1)3)1/2.
A simple integration then gives
B(Zt] = a V s ^ j ^ Z A ,
E°(r'] = aVsJ 
Therefore the analogous approximation p’ for the price of this option is
p' =
«  <£(6) +0.G26657cryi'f'(6).
As we would expect, the approximation for the price of this option is between that of 
the standard barrier option and the moving average barrier option considered in section 
2.2. Simulation is more difficult in this case as the Brownian path would need to be 
evaluated much more fully in order to find the supremum of the average price.
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2.5 Conclusions
The option that we have studied is difficult to price. The main reason for this is the 
behaviour of the moving average price process. This process is not Markov; at time 
t it is a function of price process over the interval [t — <5, t]. It seems that it is not 
possible to reduce the dimensionality of this dependence. Therefore it is not possible 
to apply standard partial differential equation methods to pricing the option. Using 
Monte Carlo simulation to price the option is also not straightforward. The method 
we used in section 2.3 does give an approximate Monte Carlo price which we expect to 
be accurate for typical parameter values.
We have used probabilistic methods to find an approximate price for both of the options 
considered. The results in section 2.3 give an indication as to the accuracy of the 
approximate price that we found for the first of the moving average barrier options. 
We would expect that our approximation for the price of the moving average barrier 
option considered in section 2.4 will depend on the parameter values in a similar way 
that the first moving average barrier option does.
The accuracy of the assumptions and approximations we have made in section 2.2 
depend on the parameter values. This gives us some idea of when we expect the ap­
proximate prices we obtain to be close to the true price. Comparing our approximation 
with the Monte Carlo prices does seem to agree with this, although this effect is com­




Large Investors, Takeovers, and 
the Rule of Law
3.1 Introduction
It is often observed that the assumptions of the Black-Scholes paradigm are all violated 
in practice, among them the assumption that agents act as price-takers. Prices can be 
influenced by positions taken, and it is a natural question to ask how this effect operates, 
say in the simplest situation of two groups of agents, perhaps a large homogenous pool 
of price-takers, and a small group of ‘large’ investors who behave differently. Effects 
of this kind have been studied in examples where there is a group of agents who are 
following some trading program, as in Frey & Stremme (1997), Gennotte & Leland 
(1990), Platen & Schweizer (1998), and Brennan Sz Schwartz (1989). The motivation 
for the difference in behaviour of this set of agents can be that they are following 
a portfolio insurance strategy. For example, they seek to trade in the underlying 
asset in order to dynamically hedge derivative contracts. Thus their behaviour does 
not fit into the model of a standard utility maximising agent. The paper of Frey & 
Stremme is typical, in that there are ‘reference’ traders and ‘program’ traders, each with 
their own demand functions, which depend on time, current price, and some ‘economic 
fundamental’ process.
This is certainly one approach to the rationalisation of the demand as a function of
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environment, where the demand functions are in effect given exogenously and prices are 
derived from that. In this Chapter we take a different approach. We aim to determine 
the demand by an endogenous derivation of optimal investment and consumption paths. 
There is a single risky asset which we consider as a share in some productive process, 
generating a dividend stream St. Initially, a pool of J  — 1 agents achieve an equilibrium 
amongst themselves, while a single (large?) agent J  stands aside.
Suppose now that agent J  decides to become involved in the market, buying and selling 
shares in some way that suits his purposes. It is clear that the valuation at time 0 of a 
share by a member of the pool must depend on the whole of agent J ’s planned future 
holdings of shares and not just on the present holding. The share price is the net 
present value of the future dividend stream from the share and therefore if it were 
known that J  was planning to squeeze the market at some point in the future, the 
present value of the share would increase. It is clear that we cannot price the share 
without determining how J  will behave in the future.
In the work mentioned above, the behaviour of the program trader is specified exoge­
nously. We attempt to determine the behaviour of J  through some optimality criterion. 
Rather than specifying the number of shares which agent J  wishes to hold at times in 
the future, we shall suppose that J  announces at the start that he intends to consume 
at rate (1 — ipt)8t at time t. This leaves a consumption rate of <pt8t for the pool. He 
chooses ip to maximise his payoff, subject to the constraint that each member of the 
pool would agree to the proposed deal. To achieve this, he must offer each member of 
the pool sufficient reward to have an incentive to agree to his proposed ip. We assume 
that the policy ip is stated, and there may be some initial redistribution of shares, after 
which the agents in the pool establish an equilibrium based on the declared dividend 
stream <p8 =  5. We will call the resulting solution the J-solution for short.
The situation just described could equally well be interpreted as the takeover of a com­
pany (ABC pic), whose shares are held by J —1 large shareholders, by another company 
(XYZ pic) operating an identical technology. XYZ (thought of as J) is assumed to have 
homogeneous ownership, and makes a proposal to the J  — 1 shareholders of ABC which 
guarantees them collectively a stated time-dependent deterministic share of the output 
of the combined firm. The J  — I shareholders of ABC then decide between them how 
this should be divided, according to the equilibrium that they would achieve when faced 
with the dividend stream (ptSt- Alternatively and equivalently, the proposal from XYZ 
states explicitly what the dividend streams should be for each of the J  — 1 shareholders,
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in accordance with this equilibrium. The shareholders of ABC now decide whether to 
accept the offer of XYZ on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The theory of this optimal choice is presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The model we 
use is similar to the continuous-consumption model of Bick (1987), where a dividend 
stream is the fundamental exogenous process and the share price is derived from the 
optimal behaviour of the agents in an equilibrium. The emphasis in the work of Bick 
(1987) is to analyse the dynamics of the share price that result in the equilibrium and 
determine if they are consistent with the Black-Scholes model.
In section 3.4 we investigate a number of examples numerically, comparing the J- 
solution with the global equilibrium, which would be achieved if J  simply entered the 
market and did not attempt to exploit his power to remain aloof. We find that there 
is always at least one member of the pool who prefers the global equilibrium to the 
J-solution; this is a simple consequence of the absence of a blocking coalition for the 
global equilibrium. Most of the examples are cases where J  prefers the J-solution 
to the global equilibrium. However, an example is given where J  prefers the global 
equilibrium.
The optimal choice for J  will of course only work if the rule of law prevails, so that 
a deal agreed at the start is enforceable. There is nothing in the specification of the 
J-solution which guarantees that we might not at a later stage find that some subset 
of the pool might prefer to walk out of the agreed deal and set up a market on their 
own. Likewise, there is nothing which guarantees that J  might not later prefer to take 
his existing holding of shares and walk out on the deal agreed originally. In section
3.5 we show that in fact the members of the pool will never choose to walk out of the 
original deal, but that J  may under certain circumstances prefer to abandon the deal 
and consume only the dividend from the shares that he currently holds.
3.2 Equilibrium for the pool
3.2.1 T h e general case
Suppose that the economy consists of a single infinitely-divisible commodity and J  — 1 
agents. The supply of the commodity is the dividend of a business which is modelled
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by the stochastic process 8t on the time interval [to, oo). This dividend is continuously 
distributed to each agent at a rate proportional to his share holding, thus at time t 
agent j  receives the commodity at rate 6j(t)St, where 6j (t) is his share holding. Each 
agent consumes the commodity on the time interval [fo, oo) and aims to maximise the 




where Cj(t) denotes the rate of agent j ’s consumption at time t. The utility function 
Uj(t, •) will be concave and increasing with
Uj(t, 0) =  oo, Uj(t, oo) =  0.
The total consumption of the agents is determined by a market clearing condition. As 
agent J  consumes at rate cj(t) = (1 — <pt)8t, the consumption rates of the remaining 
agents must satisfy
5 > W  = 8t = (ptSt. (3.1)
i< J
In order to achieve their desired consumption paths, the agents trade the commodity 
amongst themselves in return for shares or bonds. Both the share price St and the 
bond price Bt axe endogenous. The time-t wealth of agent j  is defined by
w j ( t )  =  @j( t)S t  +  (3-2)
where £j ( t ) denotes the bond holding of agent j  at time t. The usual self-financing
conditions give the dynamics of the wealth process to be
dwj(t) = 0j(t) (dSt +  Stdt) + £j(t)dBt — Cj(t)dt. (3.3)
Finally, we require that the wealth process of each agent is always positive. This bounds
the consumption of an agent and makes the problem well defined.
We now consider the consumption paths that the agents will follow. The market is 
complete and so the consumption paths of each agent will satisfy
C(*o,f) = PjWU'jfacjit)) (3.4)
for some state-price density process £(£o, t) and positive constants Pi(to),i = 1 , . . . ,  J —1,
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(see, for example, Breeden (1986)). Combining this with market clearing (3.1) gives
1  -  § ' ' ( ' ■  w )  M
where Ij ( t , •) is the inverse function to Uj(t, •). The conditions on the utility function 
mean that (3.5) determines ({to, t) uniquely in terms of St and the constants Pi(to),i =  
1 , . . . , J - 1 .
The share price is the expected net present value of the dividend stream, thus
i r°°
s t = t j Et j  ({t0,u)Sudu. (3.6)
Similarly the wealth of agent j  is the expected net present value of his future consump­
tion stream
1 f°°
WjM =  £ ( j ~ i j Et J  t{to,u)cj(u)du. (3.7)
Given the processes St, Wj(t) and cj(t), (3.3) determines the share holding process
3.2 .2  C on stant re la tive  risk aversion u tility
We now specialise by making the following assumptions, in force for the rest of the 
Chapter:
(Al) the utility functions are given by
Uj(t,x) = e~pjtx~R
for positive constants R  and pi, i =  1 , . . . ,  J  — 1;
(A2) the dividend process is of the form
St = exp(crW* +  pt) (3.8)
for some constants o and fi\
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(A3) the process ip is deterministic.
These assumptions are a significant reduction in generality; agents have a common 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and differ only in their impatience parameters pi. 
Stochastic divisions of the dividend process are disallowed. As we shall see, these 
two assumptions make the problem tractable; allowing different coefficients of relative 
risk aversion would greatly increase the computational complexity. Although such 
problems can be handled effectively numerically (see Rogers h  Yousaf (2000)), it is 
not our current purpose to get involved in such complications. The assumption (A2) is 
probably the least substantive of the three and could be relaxed quite easily, but this 
seems pointless in view of the other two assumptions being made.
The following proposition summarises the simplifications which result.
P ro p o sitio n  3.1. Under assumptions (Al), (A2) and (A3), all agents keep all of their 
wealth in shares at all times. There are positive constants P j { t o ) ,  j  =  1 , . . . ,  J  — 1 in 







The optimal consumption streams of the agents are given by
(3.12)
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and the holdings of shares of agent j  at time t  is
ej ( t ) =  ^ ( tQ t) /  ( P i M e~PiU) 1/R(Pl~R (3.13)
Proof. Assumption (Al) allows the expression for C(to,t) in (3.4) to be simplified:
C(tQ,t) = pj (to )e~Pj tCj (t)~R. (3.14)
Combining this with market clearing (3.1) gives
t ( t0,t) = d t Ry(t0,t). (3.15)
Substituting this expression for C(£o>£) into (3.6) gives the form of the share price St 
in (3.9). The consumption stream of agent j , given by (3.12), is found by eliminating 
C{to,t) from (3.14) and (3.15). The wealth of agent j ,  given in (3.7), simplifies because 
of the expressions for C{to,t) in (3.15) and cj(t) in (3.12):
wA t) =  t) E t Jt (Pj(*o)e_/^“'7'(t°,Tx)jR_1) 1/jRrft*
-  ^  f t °° (pj ( to )e -^ u7 ( t o ^ ) i2- 1) 1/jR^ - He ^ ) d u
7 ( ^ 0
St
fp{to
Jt (Pj(*o)e PjUj ( t 0,u)R l ) l , R Vlu Rea(u f)du
To find the share holding of agent j ,  we calculate the dynamics of the wealth process 
of that agent:
dwj(t) =  {Pj{to)e~PiUl( to ,u )R- 1) 1/ R ipi-Rea u^- t)diuW/ f \ v /  / /  I Lb
f w ~  or (pj(< ^ e~pju^ u)R~i)i/R ^ ~Rea{^ t)du) dt, Sgjto  1>(t0
=  ' ^ P - ( d S t + 6td t ) - c j (t)dt
The expression for 6j(t) given in (3.13) follows from this and (3.3). We also deduce 
that no agent holds any bonds at any time. □
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The vector p(to) determines the state-price density and the consumption paths, and 
hence the holdings of shares. In what follows, we have taken as given the initial share 
holdings 6(to) of the agents, and then computed the values oip(to) which match (3.13) 
to the given 6(to). We shall write
to
POO
— E  Uj(t,Cj(t))dt
i - R  L I )
for the payoffs of the different agents in the original equilibrium.
3.3 J ’s optim isation problem
We now consider a J th  agent who will follow the consumption path
cj{t )  =  (1 -  (ft) St .
The problem for agent J  is to choose the function <pt which maximises his total expected 
utility of consumption. However, he is constrained in the choice of ipt- One possible 
consumption stream is given by taking (ft =  1 — 9j(to). This choice of (ft does not 
require any trading with the pool as J  is consuming his share of the dividend as he 
receives it. But for all other choices of (pt agent J  requires the cooperation of the pool 
in attaining the desired consumption stream. We will suppose that the pool will accept 
a particular <pt if each member of the pool prefers, or is indifferent to, that choice of 
tpt over taking (pt = 1 — Oj(t). The preferences of an agent between various proposed 
functions tpt are deduced from the relative total expected utility of the corresponding 
consumption streams. Agent J , therefore, has the following problem
poo
sup E  / Uj(t , (1 -  ipt)5t)dt (3.16)
V’dPt^o)} Jto
subject to the constraints
oo
Uj(t, Cj(t))dt > 7rj° j  = 1 , . . . ,  J  — 1 (3-17)
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where 7r*° is the total expected utility agent j  obtains when ipt =  1 — 9j(to).
We can solve this problem with a Lagrangian. The y ^ i  =  1 , . . . ,  J — 1 are non-negative 
Lagrange multipliers.
Setting this derivative to zero gives the optimal <pt- In the case of constant relative risk 
aversion a solution is given by the roots of
c u s >
The function ipt is determined up to the choice of constants yi and P i{ to ) .  These are 
chosen to give equality in each constraint (3.17) and to maximise (3.16). Typically 
Oj ( t )  will not be continuous at to  and so there will be a reallocation of shares at to .
3.4 Numerical results
In this section we present some examples. The Lagrange multipliers can be calculated 
numerically when the initial conditions of the problem are specified. We will take 
to =  0. In the case of logarithmic utility, the form of St only influences the payoff by 
an additive constant, and so this is omitted. For non-logarithmic utility, St has to be 
specified. We choose St to be of the form given by (3.8) and report the value of the 
constant a , defined in (3.11). The bold typeface indicates the largest payoff for an 
agent. The final row shows the proportional change to the equilibrium consumption 
path that would be required to match the J-solution payoff.
L = E  r  I Uj(t, (1 -  Vt)h) +  y > ,C / ,((,£,(<)) 1 dt -  Y y . i r l
J t « I i<J )  i <J
a t  r °° f
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R  = 3 a  =  —0.12
Agent 1 2 J
P 1.5 1.9 2.2
6(0) 0.35 0.1 0.55
p(  0) 1 0.02972
y 0.1755 0.005216
Equilibrium payoff -2 .4 7 9 -24.75 -0.7081
J-solution payoff -2.517 -2 4 .5 1 -0 .7 0 2 5
Change 0.99232 1.0048 1.0040
R  = 0.5 a  =  0.06125
Agent 1 2 3 J
P 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0
6(0) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
p( 0) 1 1.671 2.047
y 0.5196 0.8683 1.064
Equilibrium payoff 0.8991 0.8205 0.6764 0.4791
J-solution payoff 0.8853 0.8195 0.6816 0.4819
Change 0.96945 0.99742 1.0152 1.0115
R  = 2.3 a  =  -0.0962
Agent 1 2 3 4 J
P 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.4
6(0) 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.25
p( 0) 1 0.2372 0.7980 4.750
y 0.3277 0.1878 0.1328 2.229
Equilibrium payoff -6 .0 0 6 5 -1 2 .6 8 2 -5.6642 -1.9051 -3.1163
J-solution payoff -6.0154 -12.691 -5 .6 6 1 8 -1 .9 0 3 3 -3 .1 1 6 0
Change 0.99886 0.99949 1.0003 1.0007 1.0001
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R = 0.8 a  = 0.07
Agent 1 2 J
P 0.2 1.4 1.7
m 0.35 0.49 0.16
p( 0) 1 22.99
y 0.9216 2.160
Equilibrium payoff 34.77 3.446 2.273
J-solution payoff 33.93 3.497 2.263
Change 0.88522 1.0768 0.97826
In each example, the constraints in (3.17) are met with equality. This means that the 
payoff for an agent in the pool under the J-solution is equal to the payoff which that 
agent would obtain if J  chose (ft to be given by (ft = 1 — 0j(0). If each agent in the 
pool preferred the J-solution to the global equilibrium, the pool would be a blocking 
coalition. The absence of blocking coalitions therefore implies that at least one agent 
in the pool will prefer the global equilibrium to the J-solution.
If each agent in the pool prefers global equilibrium to the payoff obtained when <pt = 
l — 9j(0), as in the first example, then the choice of <pt leading to the global equilibrium 
satisfies the constraints. Therefore agent J ’s payoff under the J-solution will be greater 
than under global equilibrium, as the J-solution gives J  his maximum payoff over 
functions ipt which satisfy the constraints.
The final example shows that J  does not always prefer the J-solution to global equi­
librium. Examples of this kind are harder to find. It seems that small changes in the 
parameter values can result in J  prefering the J-solution to the global equilibrium. For 
this reason characterising the parameters that lead to the J-solution preference for J  
is difficult.
3.5 Breakdown of the rule of law
In section 3.3 agent J  made the choice of ipt at time to and it was assumed that each 
agent would follow the consumption path implied by (pt. In this section we consider 
whether the deal reached at time to will ever break down at a future time. This would 
occur if one of two conditions holds, either
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1. a subset of the pool prefers to stop trading outside the subset and forms its own 
equilibrium, or
2. agent J  prefers to stop trading and consumes the dividend as he receives it.
The following lemma shows that condition 1 is never satisfied in the case of constant 
relative risk aversion.
Lemma 3.1. Without loss of generality assume that pi < P2 < • • ■ < Pj - i  - Let each 
agent have constant relative risk aversion, suppose that the dividend process is of the 
form given by (3.8), and assume that p j  p\. Then every subset of the pool contains 
at least one agent who prefers the J-solution to the subset equilibrium.
We will prove this lemma in the case where the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
R , is not equal to one. The log utility case, where R = 1, requires a separate (but
analogous) proof because of the different form of the utility function.
Proof. Assume R  ^  1. Suppose that A is a subset of the pool in which each agent 
prefers the subset equilibrium to the J-solution. The consumption path that agent j  
in this subset follows when A  breaks away at time r  is
4«> -  (*■•>
where
7A(r,t) =  ( ^ ( P * ( r )e_P<<)1/i2)  , (3.20)
\ i £ A  /
0 a {t ~ )  =
i e A
The share holding process which leads to this consumption path is
6j(t) =  9^ l t )  r  (3.21)
where
/oo 7a (t, u)dA{T-)~Rea(u~Vdu.
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The consumption path Cj ( t )  and share holding process that agents in the pool follow 
under the original choice of (ft are given by (3.12) and (3.13). For agent j  in the subset 
A  to prefer the alternative consumption path (3.19) to that given by (3.12) at time r  
we need
/ oo p - p j U  roc  PjUY — R C'j(.u) l ~Rdu >  Er J  1 _  j^cj ( u)1~Rdu
which can also be written as
roo - Pju / R + a ( u - T )  (  „  . (~ \1 /R  \ l - R
I  - r ^ - U *
1—R
R  ^ 7 (^ 0 , u)l!R
roo e - Pju / R + a ( u - T )  /  p . f o A / R  
— J   ^ _  r> I ~~71 \ i / P * P u  ) d l l .
Our aim now is to show that this inequality leads to a contradiction. The vector p(r) 
is chosen so that 6(t)  is continuous at t  =  r. This means that (3.13) and (3.21) must 
be equal when t  = r. Using this, our condition is equivalent to
Pj(t o) > Pj(t)
(1 -  R)ip(t0,T) ~  (1 -  R) iPa (t , r)
or again
-1
> iA(r,u)eA(T)-Rea^ d v \  . (3.22)
An expression for 0 a { t )  can be found from the expressions for 6j(t)  in (3.13) and 
7 A(r,t)  in (3.20):
1 r°°
0 a ( t ) =  J  7 . ( ^ 0 , . ) 1^ 7 ( ^ o , . ) 1- 1/ ^ i - ^ ( - ) d u .
We can take 0 a ( t ) outside the integral in (3.22) and use the expression above to obtain
J  lA(T,u)ea{u~T)du
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As this inequality holds for all j  G A, it follows that we must have
R
f a M t * ) ' - ” 1)1'* )  e“(s- T) r - , , 0 ^
 -----------------------   J  7a(^j w)e 'du
( E j e A ( P j ( T ) e ~ PjS) 1 /R )  ea{s~ T)
(1  -  R ) i / > ( t o , T ) R - 1
aoo \  R7 a (*o, « ) 1/R7 (to , jfor all s > t . Using the definition of j a  in (3.20), and integrating with respect to s on 
the interval [r, oo), we deduce that
1 r°°
YZTr J 7A(to' s)ea{s~T)di
>
ao o  \  IXj A(to,u)1/R;r{tQ,u)1~1/R(pl~Rea u^~T)duJ . (3.23)Prom (3.10), T) can be written as
W o . r )  =  j ™ y A ( t0 , u ) 1/H7 (« o ,u f - l l R v l - R e a ^
Substituting this expression for t )  into (3.23) and rearranging gives
1 r  7A«4, l~Rdu
du.
>
1 — R  f?°7A(tOiV)1/R7(totv)1~1/R<pu Rea(u~T^ du
1 - R/  roo -  /j. _ . \ l / JK~/\«. - .M - l / i£ . - l - K - .Q [ ix - r )  I 71*0,u j " '"  \ \
/ r 7 A ( t o ,« ) 1/R7 ( to ,« )1 Re“(“ T) ( 7^ " ) ^ ; )
Jensen’s inequality tells us that the reverse inequality is also true, and so we must in 
fact have equality. This is only possible when
(fit = k —
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for some positive constant k. For f t  to lie in the range [0,1] it is necessary that k < 1. 
We are able to show that this form of f t  contradicts that given in (3.18) by looking at 
the behaviour when t tends to infinity. If agent 1 is not in the subset A  then (3.24) 
implies that f t  tends to infinity as t increases, which contradicts (3.18) where f t  is 
always in the range [0,1], If agent 1 is in subset A  then according to (3.18), f t  tends 
to k and so
\  R /  / \  R
<Pt \  . I k
1 - f t )  \ l - * \
By rearranging (3.18) we find that
<Pt \ R E i <j y i e - pit/RPi(to)('1- R)/Re/lji
1-R
— ► y iev
and as pj  ^  p\ we have a contradiction. □
Now we look at the second condition. The lemma below gives conditions under which 
J  will break away. It is necessary to show that it is possible for the conditions of this 
lemma to be satisfied. We do this by presenting an example.
Lem m a 3.2. Let each agent have log utility. I f pj  < p\ < . . .  < pj~\,  p\ —pj > P2 — P1 
and P2 (to)/pi(to) — 3/2/yi < 0 then agent J  will eventually prefer to break away from 
the J-solution and hold onto his shares consuming the dividend as he receives it.
Proof. At time r  agent J ’s share holding is given by
r  7(^ 0? u)du
6j (t ) =  1 -  -r 7A ;  ■W o, t )
and so the condition for J  to break away at time r  is
log ^1 -  - T ~ J  pje~pj{u~T) log (1 -  f u) du > 0. (3.25)
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We begin by applying Jensen’s inequality to the left-hand-side of (3.25).
/  roo 7^  (1  _  ) d u \  f 00
l0g ( T  j  I  PJe T) log (1 -  du
tpu
f°° log (1 _  ipu) du r°°
>  7 °°  W..r tTL------------I  PJe~P1 log (1 — fu )  du. (3.26)
JT  Ifiu
E a c h  o f  t h e  t w o  t e r m s  i n  (3.26) i s  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  l o g ( l  —  <pt) .  I n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  l o g  u t i l i t y  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  o p t i m a l  <p g i v e n  b y  (3.18) s i m p l i f i e s  t o
m = E  i< jV ie -pit
Vt e - ^  + T,  ,< ,» « -« * •  { ]
W e  w i l l  l o o k  a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  i n  (3.26) f o r  l a r g e  v a l u e s  o f  t .  T h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  
P j  <  Pi  <  P2 <  • • • <  P j - i  a n d  (3.27) i m p l y  t h a t  l o g ( l  —  <pt) i s  i n c r e a s i n g  f o r  l a r g e  t. 
W e  h a v e
7(*o,«) (E»< j Pi (*o)e~w“) (e~PJU + E t e j V k e - Q " )
Vu T ,i< j Vi*-” *
Pi(to)e~nu  ( l  +  +  . . . )  e - " “ (l +  E k < j  Vke~(pk~pj)u)
yie~piu ^1 +  iae-(P2-Pi)ti +  ..
ElM g-PJt*
2/1 I \Pi(<o) 2/1 /  J
for large u, using the condition that p\ — pj > p i ~  Pi for the final step. After being 
normalised, 7 ( 0^ , u)/ tpu will give a measure that tends to an average of two exponentials, 
one with rate pj  and the other with rate p j —pi+P2 , as u tends to infinity. A comparison 
of the average of log(l — ipt) under this measure with the average of log(l — ipt) under 
an exponential measure with rate pj  depends on the sign of P2 (^o)/pi(^o) _  2/2/ 2/1 - 
As P2 {to)/pi(to) — 2/2/ 2/1 is negative, the average of an increasing function under the 
measure generated by /(pu will be greater than its average under an exponential
measure of rate pj.  Therefore we conclude that in this case J  will eventually prefer to 
break away. □
It remains to show that it is possible for the pi, the Pi(to) and the yi to satisfy the 
conditions imposed on them for an optimal (pt. We do this by presenting an example 
where the Lagrange multipliers have been numerically calculated. The initial time to 
is taken to equal 0.
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Agent l 2 3 J
P 1.2 1.3 1.9 0.1
6(0) 0.2 0.25 0.2 0.35
p( 0) 1 1.298 1.316
y 1.760 2.417 2.287
In this case J  initially prefers to continue with his original choice of <ft- However, by 
time 6 he would benefit from holding onto his shares and consuming the dividend as 
he receives it.
Time Payoff from original <pt Payoff from holding shares 
0 -2 .2 4 1  -3.732
3 -0 .1 0 6 5  -0.1088
6 -0.003403 -0 .0 0 3 3 7 8
The function ipt decreases to zero and 6j(t) increases to one. However, agent J  is always 
consuming at a lower rate than he is receiving the dividend. Therefore consuming the 
dividend as he receives it results in an immediate increase in the consumption rate.
3.6 Conclusions
We have investigated the impact on a simple market of a large investor who does not 
act as a price taker. Traditional approaches to the effect of a large investor on price 
have assumed that price is determined by some instantaneous equalising of supply and 
demand, but, as Arrow & Kurz (1970, p74) have made clear in a somewhat different 
context, ‘. .. we may say that it requires the future to determine the present resource 
allocation.’ It is such an analysis we have conducted here, allowing the large investor to 
choose a future dividend flow consistent with the current division of the asset among 
market participants. This can equally be considered to be the problem facing XYZ 
pic in its attempts to take over ABC pic; the bidder must offer each of the existing 
shareholders a deal that would leave them no worse off in order to get the offer accepted. 
This can be compared with the solution that would obtain if the large agent simply 
entered the market, and allowed a global equilibrium to establish itself. Examples show 
that the large agent sometimes prefers one, sometimes the other. The reason is that
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when the large agent sets up an agreed deal with the other agents, he must ensure 
that they are all no worse off, and even though he may configure the deal optimally for 
himself subject to this constraint, in a global equilibrium, it may turn out that some 
of the other agents do worse off than originally, and this may result in the large agent 
actually preferring the global equilibrium.
Having decided this, we investigated the viability of the large agent’s optimal deal in 
circumstances when there was no enforceability of the deal. It may be that at all times 
after the deal is set up, all the agents prefer to continue with the deal than to go off in 
a subset and follow their own equilibrium in that subset. We have only partial results 
here; we have been able to show that no coalition of the original pool of agents would 
ever want to walk out on the deal that they agreed to, but that circumstances can 
arise where the large agent may wish to walk out with his current share holding and 
consume the output of that. The chief characteristic of the situation where we were 
able to show this ‘walk-out’ is that the large agent is very patient. As time increases, 
his share of the productive asset increases, as does his consumption stream, but it can 
be that his consumption stream at large time is less than the consumption stream that 
would accrue from his current holding of shares. This leads him to walk away. The 
result here is similar to that found in Kydland & Prescott (1977).
The analysis of the unenforceable situation is still far from complete and appears to be 
difficult; without the rule of law, some of the deals that XYZ would propose would not 
be agreed by the ABC, because at some later stage XYZ would walk away from the 






It is commonly assumed in financial models that an investor wanting to sell an asset 
is able to immediately find an investor wanting to buy the asset. For example, the 
justification of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula in terms of a hedging portfolio 
depends upon an investor being able to continuously and instantly readjust his portfolio. 
Similarly, in the consumption/investment model that we considered in Chapter 3 we 
assumed that the agents could trade with each other in continuous time without any 
delay occurring between the decision to trade and the trade occurring. In many markets 
this may be a close approximation to reality. However, there are markets in which the 
matching of buyer to seller is less easy. A seller and a buyer may have to search for 
each other and may incur costs during this search.
The above considerations have led several people to study so-called ‘search-theoretic’ 
models. Agents may only trade with each other when they meet; typically pairs of 
agents meet at the jump times of a Poisson process. This type of model has been 
used to study the effects of the presence of money. Examples of such work include 
Diamond (1984), Kiyotaki & Wright (1991, 1993), Shi (1995) and Trejos & Wright 
(1995). Duffie et al. (2000) look at issues of price formation and bid-ask spreads in a 
similar search-theoretic model.
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In this chapter we study a simple Markov process which is motivated by these search- 
theoretic models. Suppose there are a finite number of particles (or agents), each being 
in one of a finite number of states. For any ordered pair of particles (a, b), particle a 
‘meets’ particle b at constant intensity which does not depend upon the pair selected. 
After such a meeting, particle a may change state. The probability distribution of 
the state of particle a after the meeting depends upon the previous state of a, and 
on the state of b. The Poisson processes that generate the meetings between different 
ordered pairs are assumed independent. Independence is also assumed between the 
state changes of the particles in different meetings. This gives rise to a Markov process.
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. In section 4.2 we formally define 
the model. We then go on in section 4.3 to look at the dynamical system which is the 
limit of our Markov process as we let the number of agents increase.
4.2 The m odel
Suppose that we have N  particles in total. At any time each of these particles is in 
one of J  states. We denote by rii(t) the number of particles in state i at time t, where 
i =  1 , . . . ,  J . The process
n(t) =  (ni(*),n2( t ) , . . . ,n j ( t ) )
describing the number of particles in each state at time t will be our Markov process. 
The state space of this Markov process is
< a e N J : ^ a ,  =  i v j .
The allowed jumps of the process are of the form
n -* n -  ei + ek
where i ^  k and e* denotes a vector with ith component 1, all other components 0. 
This jump corresponds to a particle changing from state i to state k. We model the
45
rate at which this happens as
j j ^ r i i t n j - S i A q Q  (4.1)
j
for some non-negative q ^ ,  i ^  and where Sij denotes the Kronecker delta. The 
interpretation of this is that, for each j , the rate at which particles in state z meet 
those in state j  is proportional to ni(rij — $ij) > and the probability that such a meeting 
results in the state i particle jumping to state k is proportional to q^ ) . The factor of 
1 /N  in (4.1) can be thought of as scaling time; in section 4.3 we will consider what 
happens to the sequence of processes we obtain by letting N  increase. Summing over 
all states j  gives the total rate.
Note that this definition of the jump rates preserves the following properties which are 
implied by the interpretation of our model:
J
•  J 2m(t) = N v t ,
i= 1
• ni(t) > 0 Vz.
It is helpful to define q\^ for each i and j  by
$ = - z e
k^i
Thus the matrices Q^  defined with (z, k)th  element as are Q-matrices.
We make the following assumption for the remainder of the chapter:
Oik > 0 Vz,j, k with z 7  ^k. (4.2)
We will find that it is often more convenient to work with the normalised process X N(t) 
defined by
X N(t) = (X i r( t ) , X ? ( t ) , . . . , X ? ( t ))
=  (n i{ t) /N,n2( t ) / N , . . . }n j ( t ) / N ) .
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We also define E  as
E  =  j:r £ R n  : ^  Xj =  1, Xi > 0 j . 
Now for /  € C2(E) consider the martingale
MiN'!  =  /(X " ( t) )  -  [  QNf(X?)d , t 
Jot —
where we have
QNf(x )  = — ^ 2 ni(nJ ~ Si j h U)ik
i,j,k
i,j,k N
dWe Taylor expand /  and apply the mean value theorem. Writing d{ for —— we obtain
OXi
QNf(x )  =
i,3,k
for some y(i,k). Since by definition
dkf (x )  -  dif(x) + - 2dk&i +  df) f (y(h  &))
E ^  =  o,
( i )terms in the summand that depend on k only through the factor qfk will vanish. 
Therefore if we define V  by
Vf{x )  = Y ^ qi k x ixodk f ( x )
i,j,k
we obtain




It follows that for a given /  G C2(E) there exists some constant K f  such that
\QNf ( x ) - V f ( x ) \  < ± K f . (4.3)
Thus the generators QN of X N are ‘close’ in some sense to V , the generator of the 
dynamical system X .  In the next section we use results of Ethier &; Kurtz (1986) to 
establish the weak convergence
X N => X  
which the above analysis already suggests.
4.3 Convergence to a dynamical system
We wish to consider the behaviour of this Markov process when N  is large. In particular 
we look at the limit of the Markov process as N  tends to infinity. We find that the 
normalised Markov processes X N converge in distribution to the dynamical system X.  
The processes X N and X  all have sample paths in the space De [0, oo). This space 
contains functions that axe right continuous with left limits, with domain [0, oo) and 
range E. The dynamical system X  is defined by the smooth vector field
V(x)  =  Y ^ X iX jq ^ e k (4.4)
i,j,k
where denotes the kth  unit vector. The next subsection is rather technical and 
formalises this convergence. We apply results from Ethier &; Kurtz (1986).
4.3 .1  P r o o f o f  convergence
The main result that we wish to apply is corollary 8.6 of Chapter 4 of Ethier &; Kurtz 
(1986). We cannot use this corollary straight away, however; first we need to show that 
the premises of the corollary are satisfied. Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 and Theorems
4.1 and 4.2 help with this.
First note that the state space E  is compact. We define F ( t , x) to be the integral path
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of V  starting from x  at time 0, that is
F(t,x)  = X(t) (4.5)
where
and
* ( 0) X.
The semigroup (Tt)t>o of the process X(t)  is given by
(Ttf)(x)  = E [ f (X ( t ) ) \X (0 )= x ]  
= f(F( t ,x ) )
(4.6)
defined on the Banach space C(E)  with the supremum norm. The first line, (4.6), can 
be taken as the definition of a semigroup for a Markov process.
A semigroup (Tt)t>o on L  is strongly continuous (see Ethier & Kurtz, 1986, Chapter 1)
We now prove that the semigroup we have defined is in fact a strongly continuous 
contraction semigroup on C(E).  This is necessary in order that we can apply the 
Hille-Yosida Theorem.
P ro p o sitio n  4.1. The semigroup (Tt)t>0 defined on C(E) is a strongly continuous 
contraction semigroup.
Proof. It is clear that {Tt)t>0 is a contraction semigroup: as we are working under the
if
lim Tt f  =  /  for every /  G L
and is a contraction semigroup if
||Tt || < 1 for all t > 0 .
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supremum norm we have
ll/ll = sup |/ (s ) |
x£E
and
\\Ttf\\ = sup\f(F(t ,x))\
xeE 
=  sup |/(y)|
y£E>
where E'  is some subset of E. Hence we deduce that ||T*|| < 1. It remains to prove 
strong continuity. As /  is a continuous mapping of a compact set to itself, /  is uniformly 
continuous. Thus
Ve, 3£ > 0 s.t. |a; -  y\ < 6 =>■ \f(x) -  f(y)\ < e.
The vector field V  is continuous on a compact set, so it is bounded. Therefore given 
5 > 0
377 > 0 s.t. \x — F(x,  t)| < 6 Vx,Vt<r]  
and the proof is complete. □
We are now ready to apply the Hille-Yosida Theorem (Ethier & Kurtz, 1986, Chapter 1, 
Theorem 2.6). This theorem, which is reproduced below, tells us that the generator A 
of the semigroup {Tt)t>0 , defined by
A *  =  ( 4 -7 >
with domain
| f  e  C(E) : lim i (Ttf  -  f )  existsj ,
is dissipative. One more piece of notation: V(A)  denotes the domain of A.
T heorem  4.1 (H ille-Y osida). A linear operator A on C(E) is the generator of a 
strongly continuous contraction semigroup on C(E) if and only if:
• the domain of A  is dense in C(E),
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• A is dissipative, that is
||A/ — A f  || > A ll/ll for all f  £ T>(A) and A > 0,
• the range of X — A is C{E) for some A > 0.
We will now work with A', which is defined to be the restriction of A  to C2(E). 
Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 and Theorem 4.2 establish the properties that are required to 
apply corollary 8.6 of chapter 4 of Ethier k  Kurtz (1986). Before giving these results 
we need a definition. A subspace S  of the domain of A  is said to be a core for A  if the 
closure of the restriction of A  to S  is equal to A. The following proposition (Ethier & 
Kurtz, 1986, Chapter 1, Proposition 3.3) is used to show that C2(E) is a core for A.
P ro p o sitio n  4.2. Let A be the generator of a strongly continuous contraction semi­
group (Tt)t>0 on C(E). Let S  be a dense subspace ofC(E).  I f T t ' . S - ^ S  for a l l t>  0 
then S  is a core for A.
As C2(E) is dense in C(E) and, for each t > 0,
Tt : C2{E) -> C2(E) 
we deduce that C2(E) is a core for A.
We now give proposition 4.3 (Ethier & Kurtz, 1986, Chapter 1, Proposition 3.1). The 
notation A|s refers to the restriction of A  to S .
P ro p o sitio n  4.3. Let A be the generator of a strongly continuous contraction semi­
group on C(E). Then a subspace S  of C(E) is a core for A if and only if S  is dense 
in C(E) and the range of X — AJ5  is dense in C(E) for some A > 0.
We apply this proposition with S  = C2(E). Now we can use the following theorem 
(Ethier k  Kurtz, 1986, Chapter 1, Theorem 2.12):
T heorem  4.2. A linear operator A 1 on C(E) is closable and its closure A is the 
generator of a strongly continuous contraction semigroup on C(E ) if and only if:
• the domain of A1 is dense in C(E)
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• A ' is dissipative
• the range of A — A 1 is dense in C(E) for some X > 0
The three criteria of this theorem are satisfied: C2(E) is dense in C(E); A  is dissipative 
(by Theorem 4.1) and therefore A ' is dissipative; and proposition 4.3 proves the final 
criterion. We deduce that the closure of A' generates a SCCSG on C(E).
We can now verify that the premises of corollary 8.6 of Ethier & Kurtz (1986) chapter 
4 hold. The closure of A' generates a SCCSG on the closure of 'D(A') (which is C(E)). 
Now the sample paths of X N and of X  are in D e [0, o o ) ,  and C(E)  is clearly an 
algebra which separates points and is convergence determining. Since E  is compact, 
the compact containment condition (7.9) of Ethier & Kurtz (1986) chapter 3 holds. 
For any /  G C2(E), with g = V f  we define
6K«) =  f ( x N« )
and
M t )  = QNf ( x N(t)).
Then (8.8)-(8.10), (8.33) and (8.34) of Ethier & Kurtz (1986) chapter 4 follow imme­
diately. Condition (8.11) of the same chapter is a consequence of (4.3), and so we 
conclude that
X N => X
if
X *(0) => X(0).
4 .3 .2  F ixed  p oin ts
In this section we show that there is at least one fixed point of the dynamical system. 
This result does not depend on our assumption in (4.2). First we define the sets Fn for 
n > 1 by
Fn =  { x e E : F ( 2 ~ n, x ) = x } .
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(Recall from (4.5) the definition of F( t , x) as the integral path of the vector field starting 
at x over time t.) Thus for each element x  of the set Fn, if the dynamical system is at 
x at some time t, then it will be at x  at time t +  2~n. For each n > 1 the set Fn is 
compact, and the map
x i—y F{ 2~n,x)
is a continuous map from E  to E. As E  is a compact convex set, Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem (see for example Border, 1985, corollary 6.6) implies that this map has 
a fixed point. Equivalently, for each n > 1 the set Fn is non-empty. It follows from the 
definition of the sets Fn that
Fn+1 ^  Fn-
Therefore the intersection of any finite collection of the sets Fn is non-empty, which 
implies that
n> 1
Let x* be an element of this intersection. Then
a;* 6 Fn Vn.
We deduce that x* is a fixed point of the dynamical system by showing that the vector 
field at x * is zero.
, F(2~n,x*) -  x*V(x*) =  lim V '
n—> oo 2 n
= 0.
4.3 .3  F ixed  p o in ts o f  th e  sy stem  w ith  tw o sta te s
When there are two states, that is when J  = 2, it is significantly easier to study this 
dynamical system. Here we show that there exists a unique fixed point of the dynamical 
system. We have




and so the system is in effect one-dimensional. In order to find any fixed points we 
look at the vector field. It follows from (4.4) that
± i  =  x \ q ^  +  x i ( l  -  X \ )  +  (1  -  x i
This is a quadratic in x \  which is easily seen to be positive at x \  = 0 and negative 
at x\ = 1. There is therefore a unique root in the interval (0,1) corresponding to 
the unique fixed point of the dynamical system. It also follows that the fixed point is 
stable.
4 .3 .4  F ixed  p o in ts  o f  th e  sy stem  w ith  th ree  s ta tes
Having found that there is a unique fixed point when we have two states, we might 
conjecture that the same is also true when there are three or more states. In this 
section we look at the case where J  = 3. As
xz =  l - x \ —X2 (4.8)
we have a two-dimensional process. It also follows that
x\ = 0 and ± 2  =  0 => x$ = 0
and hence we are looking for roots of x\ = 0 and X2 = 0. For a root to correspond to 
a point in E  we require
(^1 ,^ 2 ) € E?
where
E' = {(a;i,X2) : > 0,a;2 > 0,a:i +  ^ 2  < 1} • (4.9)




Consider the expression for x\  obtained from (4.4). If we use (4.8) to eliminate £ 3  from 
this expression then we are left with a quadratic form in x\  and x<i- Therefore the 
roots to xi  =  0 in the (X\,X2) plane will lie on a conic section. Typically this will be a 
hyperbola, parabola or ellipse. However, if the quadratic form is degenerate then the 
roots may instead lie on a line, a pair of lines, or be a single point.
Now consider the expression for £ 2  in (4.4). The same argument as above shows that 
if we eliminate £ 3  from this expression, then the roots of £ 2  — 0  are a conic section 
in the (^1 , 2:2 ) plane. Therefore the roots of the pair of equations £\ =  0 and £ 2  = 0 
lie on the intersection of two conic sections in the (£1 , 2 2 ) plane. In section 4.3.2 we 
proved that there is at least one fixed point of the dynamical system. Therefore our 
two conic sections must have at least one point of intersection in E We attempt to 
find an upper bound on the number of points of intersection.
If the two conic sections axe distinct then there can be at most four points of intersection 
in the (£i ,£ 2 ) plane, and so at most four points of intersection in E ' . If the two conic 
sections are identical, for example they correspond to the same hyperbola, then the 
intersection will be an infinite set of points. We now aim to show that we can not have 
an infinite intersection. Lemma 4.1 (which holds for any J , not just J  = 3) will be 
used for this purpose.
L em m a 4.1. Under assumption (4-2) there are no fixed points of the dynamical system 
on the boundary of E.
Proof. The points x  on the boundary of E  are characterised by the fact that at least 
one component of x is zero. Therefore by symmetry it is sufficient to show that
x\  =  0 => x\  > 0 (4-10)
on E. From (4.4) we obtain
xi = Y ^ X i X A  i -
By the definition of the qf^ , the only chance for a negative term in this sum occurs 
when i = 1 . However, the presence of the factor Xi means that when i = 1 the term in
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the sum will be zero. Our assumption in (4.2) and the fact that ]T) xi =  1 on E  imply 
that there must be a strictly positive term in the sum. Therefore (4.10) holds. □
Suppose that our two conic sections axe the same hyperbola, parabola, or contain the 
same line. We know that a fixed point exists in E  so our intersection must include a 
point in E ' . By the nature of hyperbolae, parabolae and lines, it would also include 
a point on the boundary of E !, contradicting lemma 4.1. Therefore the only way we 
could have an infinite intersection would be if both conic sections were the same ellipse 
lying entirely in the interior of E ' . To rule out this possibility we look at the quadratic 
form corresponding to x\ = 0. We do not need to find all the coefficients explicitly; 
some are abbreviated to (...).
=  x i (tfn -  9n “  93? +  93?) +  x 1 * 2  (■■•)+ x \ (• • •)
+x i ( 91?  +  93? ~ 2 9 3 ? )  +  z 2 (...) +  9s?-
When £ 1  =  £ 2  =  0 we have x\  =  ^3?  > 0. When x\ — 1, X2 =  0 we have x\ — < 0.
Therefore x\ = 0 has a root on the boundary of E', and so it cannot correspond to an 
ellipse entirely in the interior of E '. Thus we now have the result that there can be at 
most four fixed points of the dynamical system.
Index theory
We continue to work in the two-dimensional state space E'  defined in (4.9) with the 
vector field
3  3
= E E  W k q ® ,  .7 =  1,2 (4.11)
i= 1 fc=l
where the dummy variable £ 3  is defined by £ 3  =  l  — x i ~ X 2- Note that a consequence of 
lemma 4.1 is that the vector field points inwards on the boundary of E ' . We will apply 
results from Guckenheimer h  Holmes (1983) to deduce that there are an odd number of 
fixed points in E 1. Suppose that C is a closed curve in E'  which does not pass through 
any fixed points of the dynamical system. Then the index k of C  is defined by
7 1 f j  f  ( dx i \  1k =  —  / a < arctan I - — >.
2?r Jq \  \ d x 2 J )
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As we move around the curve C the index counts, positively in the anti-clockwise 
sense, the number of revolutions the direction of the vector field makes. The index 
of the curve defined by the boundary of E ' is one, as the vector field always points 
inwards on E ' . We can now apply the following result (see Guckenheimer h  Holmes, 
1983, Proposition 1.8.4):
(i) The index of a sink, a source or a center is +1.
(ii) The index of a hyperbolic saddle point is —1.
(iii) The index of a closed orbit is +1.
(iv) The index of a closed curve not containing any fixed points is 0.
(v) The index of a closed curve is equal to the sum of the indices of the fixed points
within it.
Sinks, sources, centers and hyperbolic saddle points are all types of fixed points. This 
directly implies that we must have an odd number of fixed points in E ' . Combining 
this with the previous result that there are at most four fixed points, we conclude that 
there are either one or three fixed points of the dynamical system.
The following two numerical examples show that both these cases can occur. 
Exam ple 1: U nique F ixed P o in t The Q-matrices are els follows:
/ -1 0 4 6 >
Q(1) = 9 -12 3
\ 2 7 - 9  J
/ -16 11 5
Q(2) = 14 -20 6
\ 10 11 -21
/ - 5 2 3 \
Q(3) = 7 -11
4
\ 2 6 - 8 /
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Numerical simulation of this dynamical system indicates that there is a unique fixed 
point at
xi = 0.4157389, x 2 = 0.3159193, x 3 =  0.2683418.
Independent of the choice of a:(0) we find that x(t) tends to this fixed point as t tends 
to infinity.
E xam ple 2: T h ree  F ixed P o in ts The Q-matrices are defined by
(  -2 8  3 25
Q(1) = 18 -381 363
^ 47 5 -52
/  -257 237 20 \
Q(2) = 2 - 9  7
I  2 5 - 7 /
/  - 4  2 2 \
QW = 3 - 5 2 .
{ 1 4 - 5 /
Simulating this dynamical system from various starting points indicates that x(t) tends 
to one of two fixed points as t tends to infinity. These fixed points are at
xi = 0.4056635, x 2 =  0.0542287, x 3 =  0.5401078
and at
xi = 0.0548061, x 2 = 0.2321006, x 3 =  0.7130933.
There is also an unstable fixed point at
xi = 0.0920227, x 2 =  0.1772681, x s =  0.7307093.
It seems harder to find examples where there are three fixed points. Relatively small 
changes to a couple of the elements of the Q-matrices in example 2  can result in a 
dynamical system with a single fixed point.
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4.4 Discussion
We now return to the Markov process X N(t). Under assumption (4.2) it is clear that 
X N(t) is an irreducible recurrent finite state Markov process. Therefore there is a 
unique stationnary distribution fiN for X N(t). Furthermore, as t tends to infinity the 
law of X N (t) tends to fiN irrespective of X N(0).
In view of this, the results of section 4.3 are surprising. We proved that the sequence 
of processes X N(t) converge in distribution to X .  However, the dynamical system X  
can have two stable fixed points. In such a case, X(t)  will tend to one of the fixed 
points as t tends to infinity. The starting point X  (0) will determine which fixed point 
the dynamical system tends to. Thus if the Q-matrices axe such that the dynamical 
system has two fixed points, we can choose initial distributions X ^ ( 0 ) and X (0 ) such 
that
X N(0) =* X(0)
but
lim lim X N(t) =£* lim X(t).
N —too t —>oo t —►oo
(This is clear as the left-hand-side does not depend on the initial distributions but 
the right-hand-side does.) We do not have a contradiction here, however. The weak 
convergence that we have established states that
J i m f i t / t l " ) ]  =  E[}(X))
for every bounded continuous function /  : D e [0 , o o )  —► ®L Convergence occurs under 
the Skorohod topology; functions /  which capture the behaviour of an element of 
D e [0, oo) in the limit as t  tends to infinity will not be continuous in this topology.
The weak convergence does imply that
( x N(t1) , x N(t2) , . . . , x N(tk)) =>■ (X■(tl) , X(h) , . . . , X( tk))
for every k and finite set {£i, t2 , . . . ,  tk} C [0, oo). From this we can conjecture the form 
of the stationary distributions /j,n  of the processes X N. We expect that the stationary 
distributions fiN will have density increasingly concentrated around the fixed points of
59
the dynamical system X  as N  increases. In cases such as example 1 of section 4.3.4 
where the dynamical system X  has a unique fixed point, the stationary distributions /iN 
will will have density concentrated around the single fixed point. Where the dynamical 
system has more than one stable fixed point, as in example 2 of section 4.3.4, the 
stationary distributions fiN will have density concentrated around each fixed point. 
For large t  the process X N(t) will typically be close to a fixed point, occasionally 
moving from one fixed point to another. The larger the value of N , the less frequent 
these transitions are.
4.5 Conclusions
We began this chapter by observing that a strand of the economics literature has 
focused on search theoretic models in which there are a large number of agents, and 
pairs of these meet according to a random matching process. At these meeting times 
some event which changes the state of the agents may occur. We have analysed a 
Markov process which can be interpreted as a simple search model. Typically the state 
space of this Markov process is large; this makes numerical calculation of the stationary 
distribution difficult. We have attempted to learn about the Markov process through 
the dynamical system which is its limit as we let the number of agents increase.
A general result we have found is that there is always a fixed point of the dynamical 
system. In the relatively simple case of three possible states for each agent, we have 
proved that the dynamical system has either one or two stable fixed points. Examples 
show that both these cases can occur. The methods that we used to study the dynamical 
system with three states — conic sections and index theory — do not easily extend to 
four or more states. However we would expect that the maximum number of stable 
fixed points increases as the number of states for each agent increases.
Interesting questions remain concerning the stationary distribution of the Markov pro­
cess. For example, where the corresponding dynamical system has multiple stable fixed 
points, we conjecture that the stationary distribution is concentrated near these fixed 
points. Future work could involve attempting to find how that stationary distribution 





A convertible bond is a financial instrument issued by a firm. As is the case with straight 
bonds, the owner of a convertible bond receives coupons from the firm up until the 
bond matures. However, the convertible feature means that under certain conditions 
the owner has the choice of converting the bond into shares in the firm. The owner 
would then receive the dividends paid to shareholders instead of the coupons. Some 
convertible bonds include call provision: if the firm chooses to call the convertibles, the 
bondholders must either convert their bonds into shares, or surrender their bonds in 
return for a final payment.
Two arguments are commonly put forward as to why firms issue convertible rather than 
straight debt (see Nyborg (1996)). The first is that convertible debt acts as “delayed 
equity”, that is the issuing firm, expecting the debt to be converted at some point in 
the future, benefits from receiving payment immediately for equity that is not issued 
until conversion. The second is that the convertible feature acts as a “debt sweetener”. 
The coupons on convertible debt can be set lower than those on straight debt, with the 
convertible feature compensating the buyer for this. Prom an investor’s perspective, a 
convertible bond offers greater security than a share should the value of the firm fall. 
The investor can also benefit, through the convertible feature, should the value of the 
firm rise.
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Ingersoll (1977) and Brennan & Schwartz (1977) apply the Black-Scholes methodology 
to the pricing of both callable and non-callable convertible debt. In both papers the 
value of the issuing firm is taken as the underlying exogenous process and is modelled as 
a diffusion process. The bondholders and shareholders make decisions based (at least 
in part) on the value of this process. Ingersoll (1977) concludes that, in his model, in­
vestors should never voluntarily convert their bonds except possibly when they mature. 
In the model of Brennan Sz Schwartz (1977), investors may also convert immediately 
prior to a dividend payment. However in both these papers should voluntary conversion 
occur, all bondholders will convert simultaneously. This feature seems undesirable.
In this chapter we take a firm-value approach to modelling the activity of a firm with an 
issue of non-callable perpetual convertible debt. We find the optimal behaviour for the 
management of the firm with regard to the timing of default, and the optimal behaviour 
for the bondholders with regard to voluntary conversion. This behaviour of the claim 
owners forms a Nash equilibrium. The prices of a share and of a convertible bond 
are thus found. Modelling perpetual convertible debt enables us to proceed further 
analytically than would be possible with finite maturity debt.
Leland (1994) and Leland & Toft (1996) study optimal conditions for default for a firm 
with an issue of straight debt. In these papers the value of the firm is modelled as a 
diffusion and the trigger for default is determined endogenously by the firm in order to 
maximise the value of the shares. We apply the same method in our model in order to 
find the optimal behaviour of the firm with regard to default.
We also permit bondholders to voluntarily convert at different times. The rationale 
behind this is that the voluntary conversion of a bond has two principal effects. Firstly 
the likelihood of bankruptcy is reduced, as the total coupon payments by the firm 
decrease. Secondly, the value of equity is diluted. If the effect of the latter is greater 
than that of the former, then it is conceivable that other bondholders will choose not to 
convert immediately. Emanuel (1983) and Constantinides (1984) look at the optimal 
exercise strategy for warrant holders who are not constrained to exercise their warrants 
simultaneously. Both authors conclude that simultaneous exercise of the warrants is 
suboptimal. As each author notes, this result also applies to convertible bonds. The 
framework that these papers work in does not include credit risk, however, and this 
result is therefore driven by the equity dilution effect.
In the next section we describe in detail the model.
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5.2 The m odel
We consider a firm with equity, and a single issue of convertible debt. This convertible 
debt is assumed for simplicity to be perpetual, with each convertible bond attracting 
a continuous flow of coupons at rate p per unit time. The value Vt of the firm’s assets 
at time t  is modelled as a diffusion, satisfying
dVt = Vt(adWt + ( r - 6 ) d t ), (5.1)
where r > 0  is the riskless rate of interest, assumed constant, and 8 > 0 , also assumed 
constant, represents the proportional rate of disbursement of value to the shareholders 
and bondholders, less the tax rebate received on the coupon payments. The model 
of Brennan & Schwartz (1980) permits stochastic interest rates. They observe that 
this increases the complexity of the problem significantly and appears to affect the 
results only slightly. We expect that the assumption of constant interest rates will 
have little qualitative effect on the behaviour of the claim owners. It is important to 
realise that 8Vt is not the rate of payment of dividends to the shareholders: as in Leland 
(1994), and Leland & Toft (1996), we recognise that the provisions of corporate debt 
issues often explicitly prohibit the sale of the firm’s assets in order to meet coupon 
payments. We take the tax rebate to be proportional to the coupon payments being 
made. Consequently, if there axe mt  live convertible bonds at time t, the coupon 
payments are running at rate prrit and the firm receives the tax rebate at rate rprrit 
(for some constant r  between 0 and 1). Therefore the rate at which dividends are being 
paid to shareholders is
8Vt -  (1 -  r)pmt = SVt ~ p'm t-
The dividend rate may of course be negative at times; if so, we interpret this as a 
call on the shareholders to inject more capital into the firm. The shareholders may be 
prepared to do this up to a point, but there may come a time when the rate of injection 
of capital required is so large that the shareholders would prefer to default, and throw 
the firm into bankruptcy. Should this happen, a proportion 1 — p of the firm’s assets 
are lost, and what remains reverts to the bondholders.
A bondholder has the choice of when to convert his bond (if at all). We shall suppose 
that the terms of conversion are that the bondholder receives one new share for one 
bond. Thus we assume that the conversion ratio for the bonds is unity. Clearly there
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is no loss of generality in assuming this.
If there are originally N  issued shares, and M  convertible bonds, then should all the 
bonds be converted there will be N  +  M  shares; we shall let this number be denoted 
by n throughout the rest of this chapter. The state of the system at time t is uniquely 
described by the pair (mt,Vt), where m* is the number of live convertibles at time £, 
and we shall therefore have that the price St of a share at time t, and the price B t of 
a convertible bond at time t will both be functions of (ra*, Vt) alone:
St =  S{mt ,Vt) 
B t =  B (m t,Vt).
Similarly, at time t the decision of the firm about whether to default, and the bond­
holders’ decisions about whether to convert, will depend only on the pair (m*, V*).
We assume that the bonds are owned by a continuum of infinitesimal bondholders who 
do not collaborate with each other. This avoids the need to consider pre-emptive block 
exercise by different agents, and other game-theoretic aspects of bond conversion; see 
Constantinides & Rosenthal (1984) for a treatment of such issues in another example. 
By symmetry we expect that all bondholders will aim to follow the same policy in a 
Nash equilibrium.
We shall proceed on the assumption that bonds will be converted sequentially. Should 
several bondholders all wish to convert their bonds then the order in which conversion 
occurs is random. As bonds are converted the state of the system then changes and 
it may be that the decision of the remaining bondholders about whether to convert 
or not has changed. We will find that it is necessary for the analysis to specify that 
the final e bonds can only be converted in one block. Thus the bonds will initially 
be converted sequentially, with the bondholders acting independently, until e bonds 
remain (assuming that the firm does not default). At that point, the bondholders then 
act collectively in deciding whether to convert. The reason for this condition will be 
discussed in section 5.7. Typically e will be small with respect to n. In fact, we require 
that e is chosen small enough that
p/e >  l / n - (5-2)
To make the problem well-defined we must specify the result if the choices of the firm
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and those of the bondholders conflict. We will assume that the choice of the firm takes 
priority. For example, if simultaneously the firm chooses to default and a bondholder 
decides to convert his bond, then we assume that the firm defaults. This assumption 
has little bearing on the problem.
5.3 The solution
In this section we find the solution to the problem. The only decision for the firm is the 
timing of default, and the only decision for a bondholder is the timing of conversion. 
As discussed in the previous section, these decisions depend only on the pair (m,V).  
We assume that the objective of the firm is to maximise the value of the shares, and 
the objective for each bondholder is to maximise the value of his bond. What policies 
should the management of the firm and the bondholders follow?
The choice of policy for a bondholder will depend on how he expects the firm and 
the other bondholders to behave. Similarly, the firm, in choosing a policy, must make 
assumptions about the bondholders’ policies. We aim to find functions S  and B  that 
correspond to the share and bond prices respectively, and policies II5  and 1I#  for the 
firm and bondholders respectively, which form a Nash equilibrium. This means that 
provided all agents follow their stated policy, no single agent can benefit from changing 
to a different policy. Functions S  and B , and policies II5  and 11# which form a Nash 
equilibrium axe a solution to the problem. We shall refer to these policies as optimal 
policies. Brennan & Schwartz (1977) define optimal policies in the same way in their 
context.
It is important to realise that when m > s the Nash equilibrium is made up of the firm 
acting as one agent, and each infinitesimal bondholder acting as an individual. The 
firm acts as one agent in deciding whether to default. Under our assumption that the 
ownership of the convertibles is diffuse, each bondholder can choose whether or not to 
convert his bond at any time, independently of the other bondholders. When m  = e 
there are effectively two agents — the firm and the bondholders.
Theorem 5.1 claims that a solution exists and gives some properties of the optimal 
policies.








(i) rj is continuous on the interval (e,n),
(ii) £ is continuous,
(Hi) rj is constant on the interval
(iv) rj is decreasing, and strictly decreasing for m > m*,
in terms of which optimal policies are
II5 : the management of the firm defaults when Vt < £(mt)
IIj3 .* the bondholders convert when Vt > 77(7714).
Thus the function £(ra) gives the default boundary, and the function 77(771) the conver­
sion boundary. Figure 5-1 shows these boundaries in the (771, V) plane. We will find 
that typically m* is close to e and therefore small with respect to n. Figure 5-1 shows 
77(e) strictly greater than 77(771*). It is possible that 77(e) =  77(771*). The values of the 
parameters of the model determine which of these cases occurs.
We prove Theorem 5.1 by finding default and conversion boundaries, and the corre­
sponding share and bond price functions which form a Nash equilibrium. The con­
struction of £ ( 7 7 1 )  and 7 7 (7 7 1 )  involves the functions S  and B,  defined below in terms of 
£ ( 7 7 1 )  and 7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) .  We will find later that these functions give the share price and bond 
price.
The operator C is defined by
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Vm£ m
Figure 5-1: The boundaries £(ra) (lower curve) and 77(771) (upper curve) in the (to, V) 
plane.
We now define 5  and B.
D efin ition  5.1. Given boundaries £(to) and T](m) which satisfy the inequalities (5.3)-
(5.5) and conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 5.1, first construct S  : [e,n) x [0,77(e)] —> R 
by
(51) 5(771, V) =  0 for V  < £(771)
(52) CS  +  — — T^ -  =  0 for V  e  [£(771) ,77(771)]n — 771
(53) V  S (m ,V )  is C l at £(m)
and B  : [e, n) x [0,77(e)] —> R by
(Bl) B(m, V) =  pV /m  for V  < £(m)
(B2) CB  +  p = 0 for V  G [£(ra),77(771)]
(B3) 5 (771, 77(771)) =  5 (771, 77(771))
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(B4) V  !->■ B (m ,V )  is continuous at £(m) andr}(m).
Now define £ : [0,77(e)] -» [e, n] by
C(V) = sup { e < m < n :  77(771) > F}
and finally S  and B  by
S(m, V) = S{m A£{V),V)  (5.6)
B{m ,V )  = B (m AC (V) ,V)  for 0 < V  < r)(m*) (5.7)
771 —  £ ~ £ ~
B ( m ,V )  =  S{e,V) + - B ( e , V )  for rj(m*) < V  < 77(e). (5.8)
771 771
Remarks
1. The solutions to the differential equations for S  and B  when V  G (£(771), 77(771)) 
that arise from (S2) and (B2) are
S(m ,V )  = V  ~  mp ' r +  a(m)V~a +  b(m)V0 (5.9)n — m
B(m ,V)  = ?- + a ' (m)V-a + b'{m)Vl> (5.10)r
for any functions <2 (771), 6 (771), 0/ ( 771) and b'(m), where —a < 0 and (3 > 1 are the 
roots to the quadratic
2
~z~x(x — 1) +  (r — 8)x — r = 0. (5-11)z
This is easy to verify by direct differentiation. Observe that the definitions of a 
and /3 imply the following equalities:
afi = 2 r/cr2 (5-12)
(a +  l)(fi — 1) =  26/ a 2. (5.13)
These will be used throughout this section.
2. Properties (SI) and (S3) imply that




—  (m,£(m)) =  0.
These two boundary conditions enable us to determine the functions a(m) and 
6 (777) in (5.9) in terms of £(m ). We obtain
S(m  V)  =  V  ~ mp^ r +  Pmp' l r !)£(m ) f  ^
n — m (ct + /3)(n — m) \C(m )
a m p ' / r -  (a + l)£(m) f  V
(a +  /3 )(n -m ) ’
for all V  G r](m)). The continuity of £ and rj on (e,n) implies that
5 (771, 77(771)) is continuous on this interval; and from the strict monotonicity of 
77 in (771*, 77) (see condition (iv) of Theorem 5.1) we deduce that the functions 5  
and B  defined above are continuous in (m*,n) x [0 , 77(771*)].
The continuity of V  >-» B(m, V ) at £(ra) and 77(771) gives two boundary conditions 
for the differential equation for B  arising from (B2). We could determine a'(m) 
and b'(m) in (5.10) from these boundary conditions. The expression that we 
obtain is not useful for our analysis. However, it can be seen that knowledge of 
£ and 77 allows us to construct 5  and B.
We now state and prove a theorem which gives sufficient properties of the functions 5 
and B  for them to correspond to the share price and bond price in a Nash equilibrium.
T h eo rem  5.2. Suppose that we are given boundaries £(ra) and r)(m) which satisfy 
inequalities (5.3)-(5.5) and conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 5.1. I f  the functions S  and 
B  of definition 5.1 have the properties
(PI) S(e, 77(e)) =  r](e)/n = B{e,rj{e))
(P2) 5 (6 , 77(771*)) =  5 (771, 77(771*)) for e < m  < 771*
then we extend S  and B  continuously to [e, 71) x M+ by
(P3) 5 (771, V) = 5(777, V) = V/n  for m  G [e, 77) and V  > 77(e).
Suppose that the functions S  and B  so extended have the properties
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(P4) V B(e,V) is C 1 at 17(e)
(P5) B(e,T}(m*)) = 5(e, 77(771*))
(P6) the left-derivative o fV*-f  S (m,V)  — B (m ,V)  is zero at r](m) for m > m *
(PI) B(e,V) > V/n
(P8) S(m,V)  < B (m ,V )  for m >  e, V  € (£(m),r](m))
(P9) 5(771, V) > 0 for m < fh
(P10) B(e,V) < S(e ,V) for V  € (v(m*),r}(e))
d S  dB(Pll )  for all m, the partial derivatives ——(m,r}(m)) and ——(771, 77(771)) exist and are
zero
for some m. Then S  corresponds to the share price, B  corresponds to the bond price 
and the policies II5  and IIb are optimal for m  < fh.
Remarks
1. A consequence of (P2) and condition (Hi) of Theorem 5.1 is that S(m,rj(m)) 
must be constant for m  in the interval [e,77i*]. Together with (B3) and (P5) this 
implies that
B(m,r}(m)) — 5 (771, 77(771)) =  5(e, 77(e)) for m  G [e,77i*]. (5.15)
2. We will construct boundaries £ and 77, and so functions 5  and B,  such that we 
can apply Theorem 5.2 with fh =  n. This is sufficient to prove Theorem 5.1. We 
are unable to prove that the boundary 77 which we construct is strictly decreasing 
on (m*,7i), as required by condition (iv) of Theorem 5.1. This is left as an 
assumption and is supported by numerical evidence. For further discussion of 
this see the comments following the proof of lemma 5.4 and section 5.7.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose that mo < m. Define Xt  by 
X,  = e~Tt]
p t  p t  o c
^ ( m t ,Vt) — I e~ru£ S (m u,Vu)du — /  e~ru— (mu- , V u- )dm u 
Jo Jo dm




S(mu, Vu) -  S (mu- , V u- )  -  —  (mu_, Vu- ) A m u } (5.16)
and define 5(0, V)  to be the share price when no bonds remain, that is
S(0,V)  = n
Ito’s formula implies that Xt  is a local martingale1. Therefore for any stopping time T  
which reduces Xt  we have
X0 =  S (m 0,V0) = E[Xt ]
= E , —r T
p T  p T  q  c
S(mT,VT) -  e~ruCS(mu,Vu)du — /  e~ru- ~ ( m u^ V u- )d m u 
Jo Jo dm
~ e ru l s ( m u,Vu) -  S(mu- , V u- )  -  ^ ( m u- , V u- ) A m u\
0 < U < T   ^ '
(5.17)
Now suppose that the bondholders follow policy IIjg. We aim to show that II5  is the 
optimal policy for the firm. Under 11#, if Vo < r)(m*) then the bondholders convert 
continuously except for two jumps, from m  =  m* down to m  =  e and from m — e down 
to m  = 02. If Vo > then there is also a jump at time 0. Since ^  =  0 along the
continuous conversion boundary by property (P l l ), and there is no change in 5  when 
any jumps of m occur, the terms involving changes in m in (5.17) all disappear for any 
policy that the firm follows. We axe left with
S(mo,VQ) = E ,-rT 5(mT, Vr) -  f  
Jo
l£Sdu (5.18)
for any stopping time T  which strongly reduces X.
1The function V  S ( m , V )  is not C 2 at £(m). However it is C 1 (property (S3)) and the second 
derivative exists as a measure. ltd’s formula can be extended to deal with this. If S  were not C l at £, 
there would be an additional term in (5.16) involving the local time of V  at £, whose effect would be 
to reduce the expression, since (SI)  and (P9)  imply that §xr(m,£(m)—) =  0 <  f^ (m ,£ (m )+ ).
2If 77(771*) =  77(e) then these two jumps coincide and become a single jump. It is valid to consider 
this case as one jump immediately followed by another.
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Define
Hq =  inf { t : mt = 0} (5.19)
and suppose that Tn are stopping times increasing to infinity that reduce X.  Suppose 
also that the firm chooses the rule ‘default at T” for some stopping time T. I claim 
that
nn SV — mp'CS +  ----------— < 0n — m (5.20)
in the region of the (ra, V) plane defined by the policy II#. This holds by construction 
for V  6 77(771)). When V < ((m)  we have from (SI) that £ S (m ,V )  =  0 and so





e r(TnAH°AT)S(mTnAHoAT, VTnAHoAT) +  f
Jo
e ~ ^ S ( r n Ho^ V HoAf) +
J  0 77»u
TnAH0AT _ru§Vu -  m up'
d un — m u
d u ; Tn > H q A T
,-rTr % r „ , ^ n) +  [  
Jo
-ruSVu ~ m up'
n  — m d u \ Tn < H q A Tu
(5.21)
Now consider what happens to the two terms in (5.21) as n  increases to infinity. As 
V  is bounded on the time interval [0, Ho] the second term will tend to zero. The first 
term will tend to
E
>  E
e t (h0at)S(mHoAT, VHqAT) +  f
Jo
HoAf - ruS V u - m up'
d un — m.
e -r ( ff„ A T )^ o j { i j o <  f }  + [ H°AT e- r J V u  ~ mup'
Jo
d un n — m u
where the inequality follows from (P9). Thus S(mo, Vo) is an upper bound for the net 
present value of the future cashflow from a share under any default policy. However, 
if the management of the firm follows the policy and defaults when Vt < ((mt) 
then both inequalities become equalities, the first because (S2) shows that (5.20) is an 
equality for £(771) < V < 77(771) and the second because (SI) shows that S ( m f ,V f )  = 0 
on {T < H q} .
We now apply a similar argument to the function B.  We will assume that all bond-
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holders follow the policy II# and deduce that the function B(m ,V )  gives the value of 
the bond, that is the net present value of all future cashflows. First we will assume 
that we are considering a bondholder who is one of the last to convert — he converts 
at m =  e (provided the firm does not default before then) — and that Vo < 77(7710). 
Once we have considered this case the results for the bondholders who convert earlier 
under II#, and for the case where Vo > 77(7710) will follow. We retain the assumption 
that 77lo < 771.
Let T  denote the time that the management of the firm defaults under II5 . Define Zt 
by
'tAT — rn r% / T r \ .tu
p i / \ i
Zt =  e - r((AT)B(m iAf,ViAf) -  /  e ^ C B ( m u,Vu)di
Jo
/ tA T  q jde_ru— (77iu , Vu)dmu
0 < u < tA T   ^ *
This is a local martingale as a consequence of Ito’s formula. Therefore if T  reduces Z  
we have
Zq = B(mo, Vo) =  E[Zt ]
[
/•TAT
e - r(TAr)B(TOrA f, Vta T ) -  j  e~ruCB(mu, Vu)du
p T AT q  d
-  J  e-ru — (77iu , Vu)dmu
-  Y ,  e~ru ^ B ( m u,Vu) -  B (m u- ,V u- )  -  £ (m „ _ ,V ;_ )A ra „ |0<u<TAT
Now the conversion of bonds will be continuous except for the two jumps, from m = m* 
to m  = e and from m  =  e to m = 03. We have found that B  remains constant when 
either of these jumps occurs (see (5.15) and (P3)). Since =  0 as the bonds are
continuously converted (property (Pll))  we deduce that
5(7770, Vo) =  E
p T A T
'(.TAT)B(mTAf ,  VTAf )  — /  e - TUCB(mu,Vu)du
Jo
Again, it does not matter that these two jumps may coincide and become a single jump.
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for any stopping time T  which strongly reduces Z.
Recall from (5.19) the definition of H q and let Tn be a sequence of stopping times 
increasing to infinity which reduce Z. In the region of the (m, V) plane defined by the 
policies II5  and II# we have, from (B2), that
and hence 
B{m0,Vo) = E
pT n AH oAT







e—r(tf°AT)S (m v  ) +  / e- rupdu . Tn > H q A T
Jo
,—rT-nB(m Tn,Vr j  +  [ Tn e~rupdu ; Tn < H0 A t  
Jo
Similarly to before, the second term here tends to zero as n increases to infinity. The 




™°B(0, VHo) + /  e~rupdu ; H 0 < T
Jo
-rT P V r rTe -  ^  +  [  e~rupdu ; T  < H 0
rrif J0
If we interpret 5(0 , Vh0) as the value of a share at m  = 0 and V = Vfr0 (the owner 
of the bond will have just converted the bond to a share) then we see that B (mo, Vo) 
equals the net present value of the future cashflow to the owner of the bond.
Now consider a bondholder who converts when m > e under II#. By the definition of 
IIb this bondholder converts at V = r](m). Property (B3) shows that the functions 
S  and B  are equal here. Therefore the net present value of the future cashflows for a 
shareholder and a bondholder who does not end up converting until m  =  e are equal. 
The converting bondholder is swapping one cashflow for another with the same net 
present value. Thus B (mo, Vo) equals the net present value of the future cashflows 
to bondholders who convert before m  = e under II#, as well as those who convert at 
m = e under II#.
Next we aim to prove that any alternative policy for a bondholder results in a decrease
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in the net present value of his future cashflows. We assume that the management of 
the firm follows II5 and the other bondholders follow II5. Let He be defined by
H e = inf {t :m t  = e} .
The process V* remains on the interval [€{mt),r)(mt)\ for t  < H e. If a bondholder 
follows an alternative policy and ends up converting before H e then we must have 
Vt < r}(mt) at the time of conversion. As we have identified the functions S  and B  with 
the share and bond prices under II5 and IIb, property (P8) shows that this bondholder 
has decreased the net value of his future cashflows. Thus his behaviour is suboptimal.
The case where e bondholders remain and act collectively needs to be treated separately. 
Suppose that mo — e and recall the definition of T  as the time of default under II5, 
and of the local martingale Zt in (5.22). A policy for the bondholders now corresponds 
to a choice of Hq, defined in (5.19). We have4
Zq = B(mo,  Vo) =  E[Zh0]
= E e-r(H0AT)B{m v  ) _  / e~ruCB(mu, Vu)du
Jo
p H 0/\T  q q~ J0 6 VU'dm<rnu' V^ dmu
-  e~TU Vu) -  B (m u Vu- )  -  ^ ( m u_, f4 _)Amu|
0< u < H q A T
Property (PI) shows that B(m, V) can only decrease at the point of conversion5. For 
V  6  (£(e), 77(e)) we have from (B2) that
CB(e,V) = -p .
For V  > 77( m ) ,  property (P7) implies that
CB(e, V) = -  — .n
4If we did not have the C 1 condition o n K n  B ( e , V ) at 7 7(e) of (P4) then there would be an extra 
term in this expression for Z q  involving the local time of V  at 7 7(e). Since (P3) and (PI)  imply that 
f ^ ( e ,7 7 ( e ) —) <  1 /n  =  ^ ( s , r } ( e ) + )  this term would decrease Z q .
5Again B{0, V)  is interpreted as the value a share at m =  0.
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The bound on 77(e) in (5.5) then shows that —p is an upper bound for £ B (e , V). Thus
'Ho AT  
r0
and it follows that no alternative policy can improve upon IIb -
B{m 0,Vo) > E
r
e-r(ff0AT1B (mHaAf ,  VH Af) +  /  e~Tnpdu
Jo
Finally consider the situation if Vo > 77(7710). Under IIb there will be immediate 
conversion and an immediate jump in ra*. We consider three cases here.
If 77io > 771* and 77(7710) < Vo < 77(771*) then (5.6), (5.7) and (B3) show that the value 
of the bond and share are equal and do not change as the jump in m  occurs. Thus 
Z?( 772.0 , Vo) corresponds to the net time- 0  value of the future cashflows to a bondholder. 
Furthermore a bondholder who follows an alternative policy and chooses not to convert 
does not benefit — as the other bondholders convert the value of the bond remains 
constant.
If 77(771*) < Vo < 77(e) then the bonds are converted instantly down to 771 =  e. Under 11# 
all bondholders will attempt to convert; the order of conversion is chosen at random. 
Thus an infinitesimal bondholder will convert with probability and will remain a 
bondholder with probability Therefore (5.8) shows that B{ttiq,Vq) corresponds to 
the net time-0 value of the future cashflows from the bond. An alternative policy for 
a bondholder is not to convert. By doing this the bondholder ensures that he holds a 
bond when m  — e other bonds have been converted. Now (5.8) and (P10) show that 
B(mo , Vb) becomes an upper bound for the net time-0 value of the cashflows to the 
bondholder under this alternative policy. Therefore this behaviour is suboptimal.
The last case is when Vo > 77(e). Property (PS) shows that
S ( m ,V o )= B (m ,V 0) =  -n
for all m. We have already shown that it is suboptimal for the final e bondholders to 
delay conversion if V  > 77(e). This case is therefore straightforward as all bonds are 
converted immediately. □
It remains to define the boundaries £(m) and 77(771) and to prove that S  and B  have 
the required properties. From (5.9) and (5.10) we see that the functions S  and B  have
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a similar form — the sum of terms linear in V , a term in V~a and a term in V&. We 
will find throughout this section that we are dealing with functions of this form. It is 
helpful now to present a lemma which establishes some properties of such functions.
L em m a 5.1. / /  /  : (0, oo) —> E is of the form
f(x )  = a +  bx +  cx~a +  dx&
for constants a, b, c, d, with c and d not both equal to zero then f "  has at most one 
zero and f  at most two zeros. Furthermore, if b > 0 then f  cannot have a maximum 
and then a minimum; if b < 0 then f  cannot have a minimum and then a maximum.
Proof of lemma 5.1. The second derivative of /  is
f"{x)  =  a(a  +  l)ca;_a-2 +  /3(/3 — 1 )dx&~2
which has at most one root. Therefore f  has at most two zeros. Suppose b > 0 and /  
has a maximum and then a minimum. These would then be the only two zeros of 
which together with the form of /  would imply that
lim/(rr) =  —oo
and
lim f (x )  = oo.
xfoo
This is only possible if c < 0 and d > 0. However if this were the case then we would 
have
f '{x)  =  6 — acx~a~l +  fidx^-1
> 0
which is a contradiction, since f ’ has two zeros. A similar argument shows that if b < 0 
then /  cannot have a minimum and then a maximum. □
We now proceed to define the boundaries £{m) and rj(m). We begin by defining the 
values of £(e) and t](e). The form of S(e,V)  for V  G (£(e),?7(£)) is given in (5.14). We 
must choose £(e) and 77(e) so that V S(e,V)  is continuous at 77(e).
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The continuity of V  ■-» B(e, V) at 77(771) and property (P4) imply that
B(e,r, (e)) =  n^
and
dB  . 1
av{e'*e)) =  n-
Thus we can solve for the functions a'(e) and b'(e) in (5.10) to obtain
B ( e V) = -  - (®)r a  + /3
a p / r - { a  + l)r){e)/n (  V  \ p , c ooN
 ^ ■ <5-23)
for V  G (^ (e ), 77(e)). This defines B(e,V)  on this interval. The choice of £ (e )  and 77(e)
must ensure that V  v-> B(e, V) is continuous at £(e). Lemma 5.2 proves that a solution
exists.
Lem m a 5.2. There exist £(e) and 77(e) satisfying the bounds in (5.3)-(5.5) such that 
the functions V  i-)- 5(e, V) and V  h* B(e,V) are continuous and
B(e, V) > V/n.  (5.24)
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 show examples of the functions S{e,V)  and B(e,V)  that lemma 
5.2 describes. In figure 5-2 the function S(e ,V)  crosses the line V/n  between £(e) and 
77(e) and then meets this line from above at V = 77(e). In figure 5-3 the function S(e, V) 
remains below the line V/n  between £(e) and 77(e) and approaches this line from below 
at V  =  77(e). The particular parameter values chosen determine which one of these 
figures is appropriate.
Proof of lemma 5.2. I claim that for any candidate value of 77(e) there exists a unique 
£(e) on the interval
(0, min{77(e), ep;/J})
such that the function <S(e, V) is continuous in V  at V = 77(e). Recall from (S5) that 
S(e, 77(e)) =rj(e)/n.
78
0Figure 5-2: Possible form of S ( e , V ) (solid line) and B(e , V)  (dashed line) with these 
functions crossing below the conversion boundary. The dotted line is V/n.
o
Figure 5-3: Possible form of S(e,V)  (solid line) and B(e , V)  (dashed line) with these 
functions not meeting until the conversion boundary. The dotted line is V/n.
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To see this first consider the expression in (5.14) for S(e, V)  as a function of £ for fixed 
V.  That is, consider the expression
V  ~ £ p ' / r  + P e t f / r  ~  { P  ~ l)gQ
n — e (a + fi)(n — e)
aep'/r  — (a; +  1)£ / V \ ^  
+  (a  +  /5 )(n -e )  ( J J
 — e ' /  r
©
for fixed V. It is apparent that as £ decreases to zero, this expression tends to infinity. If
we choose a small enough £(e), therefore, S(e, V) will have a negative jump at V  = 77(e).
S(e, V)  having a positive jump at V  = 77(e). If 77(e) > ep'/5 then choosing £(e) =  epf /8 
yields
V  AS'(e, V) is concave for V  G (^(e),77(e)). As S(e,V )  equals zero and has zero 
derivative at V = £{e), we conclude that S(e, V) < 0 for V  on this interval. Thus in 
this case also 5(e, V)  has a positive jump at V = 77(e).
The expression for S(e,V)  on the interval (^(e), 77(e)) is continuous in £(e). Therefore 
we deduce that there exists a value of £(e) satisfying the bounds in (5.3) which makes 
the definition of 5(e, V) continuous for any candidate 77(e).
Next we will show that this £(e) is unique. Suppose there were two such values of £(e). 
Then consider the two expressions for S(e, V) in the interval (^(e), 77(e)). Lemma 5.1 
implies that both expressions have minima at their respective values of £(e). As these 
functions cannot have a maximum and then a minimum, both must tend to infinity 
as V  0. Therefore there exists some V  between the two values of £(e) at which the 
expressions are equal. We also know, by construction, that the expressions are equal 
at V = 77(e). This gives the required contradiction as the form of the difference is a 
non-zero sum of a multiple of V~a and a multiple of which can have at most one
The expression for S(e ,V)  given in (5.14) equals zero and has zero derivative at V  = 
£(e). So if 77(e) < ep'/8, choosing £(e) close enough to but less than 77(e) will result in
for £(e) < V  < 77(e). This equation can be obtained by differentiating (5.14) and using 
the identities (5.12) and (5.13). The right-hand-side is negative for V > £(e) and so
root.
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The next step is to show that we can choose 77(e) so that B(e,V)  is continuous at
V  =  £(e). First suppose our candidate 77(e) is less than np/6. Then we find the £(e) 
which makes S(e, V) continuous at V  =  77(e). The definition of B(e, V) ensures that it 
is C 1 at V = 77(e). By differentiating (5.23) and applying identities (5.12) and (5.13) 
we find that, for V  E (£(e), 77(e)),
-  ((« +  1 )P ~ aSrj(e)/n)
-  ((£ -  1 )p ~ PSri{£)/n)
0.
Therefore B(e,V)  is concave in V  for V  E (^(e),77(e)), and so is less than V/n  for all
V  E (£(e), 77(e)). This implies that there is a negative discontinuity in B  at V  = £(e).
Now we show that by choosing 77(e) large enough there is a positive discontinuity in B  
at V = £(e). We have already found that, given 77(e), the £(e) which makes S(e,V)
continuous at V = 77(e) is bounded above by ep'/6. Consider the expression for B(e, V)
in (5.23). For large enough 77(e), the coefficient of V& in (5.23) is positive. Therefore 
we have
r  a  +  p  \ r t ( e ) J
for large enough 77(e). As 77(e) tends to infinity the right-hand-side of (5.25) also tends 
to infinity uniformly in V  for V  E (0,ep'/8). Thus, as the expression for B(e,V)  on 
the interval V  E (^(e), 77(e)) is continuous in 77(e), there exists a value of 77(e) satisfying 
(5.5) for which B(e, V) is continuous at V = £(e).
It remains to prove that inequality (5.24) holds. By construction we have
gy(e ,  n(e)) =  (5.26)
The differential equation for B  in (132) gives us the following, valid for V  E (£(e), 77(e)):
J1  n 2  d  a  p>
Y V 2- ^ ( e , V )  + ( r - S ) V w ( e , V ) - r B ( e , V )  + p = 0.




Property (P4) states that V B(e ,V)  is C l at V  =  77(e). However, it may not be C2 
at V = t) ( e ) .  Therefore, taking limits as V  increases to 77(e) yields
iim [ ° ' v ^ t V ) \ + ( r - s)M - M + p  = 0
v t v ( e )  {  2 d V 2 J n n
=*• lim ( ^ K 2^ ( e , =  S ^ - p  (5.27) v id (s ) \2  9K2V ’ ' J  n H v '
The bound on 77(e) in (5.5) shows that the right-hand-side of (5.27) is positive. There­
fore the function V  »->■ H(e, V)  is convex for V  close to 77(e), and so H(e, V) exceeds 
V/n  when V  is close to (but less than) 77(e). We also know, from (5.2) and (HI), that 
B(e,V)  exceeds V/n  at V — £(e). Therefore if B(e,V)  were less than V/n  for some 
V  in the interval (^(e),77(e)), we would require that it crossed the line V/n  (at least) 
twice in this interval. For this to happen B  would have to change from being convex to 
concave, and then to convex again as V  increased from £(e) to 77(e). This contradicts 
lemma 5.1 so we deduce that (5.24) holds. □
Lemma 5.2 does not claim the uniqueness of £(e) and 77(e). Numerical evidence indicates 
that £(e) and 77(e) are unique. If, however, there are several pairs £(e) and 77(e) that 
satisfy lemma 5.2, we can choose any pair and build the Nash equilibrium from these.
Now we aim to define m* and the functions £ and 77 on the interval (e,77i*j. It will 
be easier to work with the functions S  and Y  rather than with S  and B, where Y  is 
defined by
Y{m ,V )  =  S ( m , V ) - B { m , V ) .
As figures 5-2 and 5-3 show, there axe two different forms of the solution at 771 =  £ 
depending on whether Y(e, V) exceeds 0 or not on the interval V  G (£(e),?7(^))- If it 
does, then we define 77(771) for m  G (e, 77i*] to be the root of
Y(e ,V)  =  0
on the interval (£(e), 77(e)). (As y(77i, V) is negative at V  = £(e) and zero at V  =  77(e), 
the form of Y ( m ,V )  deduced from (5.14) and (5.23) together with lemma 5.1 imply 
that there is at most one root on this interval.) Otherwise we define 77(771) =  77(e) for 
m  G (e, 771*]. This definition is consistent with (P5), (P10), and conditions (i), (in) 
and (iv) of Theorem 5.1.
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We can find a differential equation for Y (m ,V )  on the interval V  G ( £ ( 7 7 7 ) ,  7 / ( 7 7 7 ) )  from
(S2) and (B2):
CY  +  ^ - (w~ mT)p =  0 (5.28)n — m
The general solution to this differential equation is
Y ( m ,V )  = V  ~  (”  ~ mTW r  +  a"(m ) V - a +  b"(m)Vfl (5.29)
77 —  771
for any functions a"(m) and b"(m). We can infer from (BY) that
Y  ( 7 7 7 ,7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) )  =  0
and from (SI) and (Bl)  that
Pt M
777
A s  5  a n d  £ ?  m u s t  b o t h  b e  c o n t i n u o u s ,  Y  m u s t  b e  c o n t i n u o u s .  T h e r e f o r e  w e  c a n  s o l v e  
f o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  a " (7 7 7 )  a n d  bu(m):
a"(m) =  r](mfg(m)  +  i ( m f h ( m )
b"(m) = -
(£(m)~ar](m)P — ((m)^r}(m)~a)(n — m) 
rj(m)~ag(m) +  £(m)~ah(m)
(£(m)~ari(m)P — ^ ( 7 7 7 ) ^ 7 7 ( 7 7 7 ) “ “ )  (7 7  — m ) '
w h e r e
< 7 (7 7 7 ) =  (7 7  — mT)p/r — (np +  7 7 7 ( 1  — p))£(m)/m,
h(m) = 7 / ( 7 7 7 )  —  ( 7 7  — mr)p/r.
For 777 G ( £ , 7 7 7 * ]  we will define £ ( 7 7 7 )  so that V  »->• S(m, V) is continuous at 7 / ( 7 7 7 ) .  We 
define m* so that (P6) and (P8) hold. We do this in lemma 5.3.
Lem m a 5.3. There exist m* and £ ( 7 7 7 )  for e < m < m* satisfying inequalities (5.3),
(5.4) a,nd and conditions (?) and (ii) of Theorem 5.1 such that the function S ( m , V ) is 
continuous and properties (P6) and (P8) hold.
Proof of lemma 5.3. First we will define the default boundary £ ( 7 7 7 )  so that S(m ,V)
is continuous. We have already determined the value of 5 ( 7 7 7 , 7 / ( 7 7 7 ) )  through (5.15). 
Equation (5.14) gives the form of S(m ,V)  for V  G ( £ ( 7 7 7 ) ,  7 7 ( 7 7 7 ) ) .  In lemma 5.2 we
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proved that there is a unique choice of £(e) that made V  »-)• S(e, V ) continuous at 77(e). 
The same argument can be applied here and so we do not repeat the details. Briefly, if 
we choose a small enough £(m) then V  *-> S(m, V) will have a negative jump at 77(771). 
If we choose a large enough £(ra) then we have a positive jump at 77(771). Thus there 
exists a value of £(771) which makes S  continuous at V  =  77(771). Uniqueness follows 
exactly as in lemma 5.2.
We now aim to define m*. As Y(e,V)  is negative on V  E (£(e), ??(£+)) we deduce that
|^(e,77(e+)) > 0.
If we define m* by
771*  =  inf {m : the left-derivative of V  »-> Y(m, V)  at 7 7 (7 7 1 )  is non-positive}
(5.30)
then lemma 5.1 implies that
Y (m ,V )  < 0
for e < m  < m* and £ ( 7 7 1 )  < V < r)(m). Property (P8) is therefore satisfied. We have 
constructed the function 5 (771, U) to be positive at V = rj{m). Therefore lemma 5.1 
implies that V  S(m, V)  must be convex at £(m). We will use this to prove that the 
bound on £ ( 7 7 1 )  in (5.3) is satisfied.
The differential equation for 5, valid for V  G ( £ ( 7 7 1 ) ,  7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) ) ,  is
<J2 2 ( T ( r \ T f T r t  a t  5 V  ~  TYlp'
~2v  Qv2(m <v ) + (r - s)V o v ( m ’V ) - r S (m <v ) +  n _ m  =  °-
The function V  5(m, V) need not be C2 at £ ( 7 7 1 ) .  However, we know that it is C 1 
and that both the function and its derivative are zero at £ ( 7 7 1 ) .  Taking limits as V  
decreases to £ ( 7 7 1 )  yields
Um ( g y  2 | g ( +  =  0 (531)
vi£(m) \  2 dV2K ’ n - m  v ;
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As V S(m, V)  is convex at £(771) we deduce that
d2S
lim xTH (m ’V ) -  0v|£(m) d V 2
which completes the proof. □
It is not obvious that the m* defined in (5.30) exists. Numerical evidence indicates 
that for realistic parameter values m* is close to e and small with respect to n. We 
shall proceed with this in mind. Note, however, that if the left-derivative of V  
Y ( m , V ) at 77(777.) remains positive as m  increases to n, lemma 5.3 provides a method 
for constructing a Nash equilibrium for all m. From now on we will assume that m* < n.
It remains to find the solution when m > m*. We continue to work with S  and Y  
rather than S  and B.  For V  in the interval (£(ra), r)(m)) the function Y (m, V) is given 
by the expression in (5.29). We can determine the functions au(m) and bn(m) in (5.29) 
in terms of 77(771) in order to satisfy (P6):
t  n  t  r \  V  —  1 I I  —  I I L I  ) U  IY(m, V)  =  ------^ +
n — 77i (a +  /5) (77. — m)
a(n — m T ) p / r  — (a + f  V
(a +  /?)(n -  77i)
 {n mr p/ r  t /3(n — mT)p/r — (/3 — l)r}(m)
P n 77
U C K I L -  I I L I  J f J /  l  -  K u - r  ± ) I I \ I I L )  f   V (5 32)
for V  6 (£(771), 77(771)). Observe that, by construction, this form of Y(m, V ) is also valid 
when m — m*. Lemma 5.4 shows that a solution exists.'
L em m a 5.4. There exist ^(m) and 77(771) for m  G (m*,n) satisfying conditions (z) and
(ii) of Theorem 5.1 such that S (m,V)  and Y ( m ,V )  are continuous, and (P8) holds.
Figure 5-4 shows how the functions V  S (m ,V)  and V  h* Y ( m ,V )  typically behave 
for fixed m > m*. (In figure 5-4 we have ^ ( 771, V") equal to zero for V  > 77(771); this will 
not necessarily be the case.)
Proof of lemma 5.4. It turns out that the boundaries £(m) and 77(771) will be given in 
terms of the solution to an ordinary differential equation.
In order for V Y ( m ,V )  to be continuous at £(771) we must have that y(m , V), as 
given by the expression in (5.32), tends to -p£ (m ) /m  as V  tends down to £(777). This
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V v ( ™ )
Figure 5-4: Typical behaviour of the functions S(m,  V)  (dashed line) and Y ( m , V )  
(solid line) for m  > m*.
gives the following relationship between £(777) and 77(771):
p£{m) _  €{m) — (n — mr)p / r /3(n — mr)p / r  — (f3 — 1 )77(771) f  £(rn)\
771 n — 771 (a +  /3) (77 -  m)
Pa(n — mT)plr  — [a +  1 ) 7 7 ( 7 7 1 )  / ^ ( 7 7 1 )  \  
( a +  /3)(n -  m) \  7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) / (5.33)
We are unable to write £(771) explicitly in terms of 77(771), or vice versa, from this 
equation. In fact, it is not immediately clear that £(771) uniquely determines 77(771), or 
vice versa. We will shortly avoid this problem by changing variables. For now, however, 
notice that (Pl l )  implies that
(5.34)
As S ( m , V)  is continuous we could apply this differential equation to the expression for 
S( m, V)  in (5.14). This would give an expression for the derivative of £(771) in terms 
of £(777) and 77(777). Given the initial value £(777*) we would be able to find £(777) and 
77(777) for 777 € (777*, 77) through this differential equation and (5.33). This is essentially 
the method we use. However, we change variables to obtain an explicit differential
86
equation and so avoid the difficulties mentioned above.
We define 6(m) by
*(TO) =  j M  (5.35)
and work with 6(m) and 77(771) rather than with £(m) and 77(771). The solution at m* 
gives us the value of 6{m*) and we will find that we can obtain an explicit differential 
equation for Q(m). Replacing £(m ) with 6(m)r}(m) in (5.33) yields
_  p6(m)r](m) =  -  (n -  mr)p/r  /3{n -  m r)p /r  -  (ft -  1 )rj(m) . . Q
m  n - m  {a +  /3)(n -  m) Km)
a(n  ~  mT)p/r -  (a +  l)rj(m) . 0 
(a +  fi)(n -  m)
We can now write r}(m) in terms of 6(m):
, x =  _________ (n -  mr)  (^6>(m)~a +  a d ( m f  - a - 0 )  p/r_________
^ 171 (fl — l)0(m)~a +  (a +  l)0(m)£ — (a 4- (3)0(m)(np +  m (l — p)) /m
y )  =  V ~  TnP,/ r +  Pmp'/r - ( p  -  l)6(m)r)(m)
We also rewrite (5.14) in terms of r](m) and 6{m):
( v va
n — m {a +  P){n — m) \9(m)rj(m) J
amp' /r  -  (a +  l)6>(m)yy(m) f  V  V  ( .
(a + (3)(n — m) \Q(m)r](m))
Equation (5.36) allows us to eliminate 77(771) from (5.37), giving an expression for 
S(m, V) in terms of 6(m) only. Applying the differential equation (5.34) to this form of 
S ( m , V) then gives an explicit differential equation for 6(m). We have an initial value 
9(m*) and so we can find 0(m) for m  G (m*, n). For each m, equations (5.36) and then
(5.35) give 77(771) and then £(771) from 6(m).
Next we prove that (P8) holds. We are also able to find a lower bound on 77(771). From 
(5.28) we have the following differential equation for Y :
c72t _2(92T / , . . . rd Y , _r/ , 6V -  i n -  mr)p
Y v  av2(m’v ) + (r - V v av(m’v ) ~ {m’ ) + --------------  =
We have defined V \-*Y(m, V) so that both the function and its left derivative are zero
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at 77(771). Therefore taking limits as V  increases to 77(771) gives
lim (foggfov) ) + H m ) - ( n - mr)p = Q
VfTj(m) f 2 dV 2 J n — m
Now Y ( 771, £ ( 771) )  is negative and so lemma 5.1 implies that we must have
Y {m ,V )  < 0
for V  G (£(771) ,77(777)). This is equivalent to (P8). We also deduce that Y (m ,V )  must 
be concave in V  at V = r)(m). Therefore
d2Ylim -^TToim^V) < 0
v tv(m) dV 2
and the bound
77(777) > (n — 7tit)y (5.38)
0
follows □
We have proved that the boundaries £ ( 7 7 1 )  and 7 7 (7 7 1 )  and the functions S  and B  satisfy 
most of the premises of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. However, lemma 5.4 does not claim that 
the bound on £ ( 7 7 1 )  in (5.3) holds, that we can take 771 =  71 in (P7), or that condition 
(iv) of Theorem 5.1 holds. We now prove the first two of these properties.
L em m a 5.5. With the functions £ and S  defined through lemma 5.4, inequality (5.3) 
is satisfied and we may take in = n in (P7).
Proof of lemma 5.5. The form of S  in (5.9) together with lemma 5.1 shows that on the 
interval ( £ ( 7 7 1 ) ,  7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) ) ,  the function V  S (m ,V )  can have at most two turning points 
and cannot have a maximum and then a minimum. We defined the function S  so that 
| ^ ( 77i ,  £ ( 7 7 1 ) )  =  0. Therefore if
5 (771, 77(771)) > 0 (5.39)
we deduce that S(m ,V )  is positive for all V  G ( £ ( 7 7 1 ) 5 7 7 ( 7 7 1 ) ) .  This would imply that 
V  ■->- S (m ,V )  is convex at £ ( 7 7 1 ) .  We could then deduce from (5.31) that the bound 
on £(m) in (5.3) holds. It is therefore sufficient to prove that (5.39) holds for all 
m  G ( 7 7 1 * ,n) .
By construction (5.39) holds for m  < m*. Suppose that m defined by
m  =  inf {m : 5(m, 77(771)) < 0}
is less than n. The continuity of 5(m, V ) and 77(771) imply that m  > m* and that
5 (771, 77(771)) =  0. (5.40)
and that (P7) holds if we take m  = m.  Theorem 5.2 therefore shows that S (m ,V )  
corresponds to the value of the share for m < m. Now consider the net present value 
of the cashflows from a share if mo =  m and Vo =  77(771). The bound on 77(771) in (5.38) 
shows that the dividend rate to a shareholder, given by
SV  — mp'  
n — m  ’
is positive at time zero. Under II5  a bondholder will convert immediately and so 
77io+ < mo =  771 and hence 5(m^,Vt) will be non-negative at t = 0+. The function 
5 ( m o - i - ,  V o + )  corresponds to the share price at ( m o + ,  V o + ) .  Therefore we must have that 
the net time-0 value of the cashflow to a shareholder is strictly positive, contradicting 
(5.40). This proves that (5.39) holds for all m (E (m*,7i). □
The final property that we need is condition (iv) of Theorem 5.1, for m > m*. This 
property is required as 5  and B  are defined through (5.6) and (5.7) when 77(771) < V  < 
77(771*) and they may not be continuous in m across the boundary 77(771) if 77(771) is not 
decreasing. For m on the interval (m*, n) the boundary 77(771) is defined in terms of 
6(m) by (5.36). The function 0(m) is the solution to a differential equation, and it is 
difficult to obtain properties of 0(m).  We leave condition (zu) of Theorem 5.1 as an 
assumption. It is satisfied in all numerical examples we have looked at.
5.4 Sm ooth pasting
Property (S3) of definition 5.1 states that the function V  ■-* S ( m , V )  is C l at the 
default boundary. Property (P4) of Theorem 5.2 requires that V  I-* B(e,  V)  is C 1 
at the conversion boundary, and property (P6) of the same theorem states that the 
left derivative of V  »->■ Y (m, V)  is equal to zero at the conversion boundary. All 
these conditions are examples of smooth pasting conditions. In section 5.3 we have
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proved that we have a Nash equilibrium. In this section we attempt to justify the 
smooth pasting conditions more intuitively and explain why a smooth pasting condition 
corresponds to the optimal choice of a boundary.
For this purpose we consider the default boundary £(m). The location of this boundary 
is determined by the firm and should therefore be chosen so as to maximise the share 
value. At and below the default boundary the share value will be zero. Above the 
default boundary there will be an interval in which all agents take no action. In this 
interval the share price solves the differential equation in (S2) of definition 5.1 and so is 
given by (5.9). As can be seen from (5.9), this differential equation does not determine 
S  explicitly — there are two unknowns a(m) and b(m) to be chosen. Typically we have 
a boundary condition, independent of the choice of £(ra), which gives one constraint on 
the choice of these functions. For example, Leland (1994) studies the pricing of straight 
debt (that is, bonds issued without the convertible feature) and obtains a boundary 
condition from the behaviour of the price of this debt as V  tends to infinity. In our 
context the boundary condition is given by the price of the share at the conversion 
boundary 77(771). The boundary 77(771) is determined by the bondholders and the share 
price at this boundary is independent of the choice of £(771). Note that we do not require 
that the choice of conversion boundary 77(771) is optimal for the bondholders, only that 
the choice of conversion boundary fixes the share price there.
The choice of £ ( 771) gives a second boundary condition, as 5(m , V) must be continuous 
at V  =  £(m), and so determines the functions a(m) and 6 ( 771) .  Suppose, for some choice 
of £(m), that the share price between £(m) and 77(771) is given by
S(m , V) =  f(V )
and that this function f{V )  does not smooth paste to zero at V = £{m). Then consider 
the function
for some positive x  chosen small enough. Note that the expression in the curly brackets 
is positive for V  < 77(771) and zero at V = The function f(V )  satisfies the
differential equation in (S2) and the boundary condition at V  = r](m) and so is a valid 
choice for the share price function, provided that it reaches zero at some value of V. 
We would then choose the default boundary £ (m) to be this value of V.
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0 |(m ) £(m) 77(771)
Figure 5-5: The smooth pasting condition
As /(V ) does not smooth paste to zero it must cross zero at £(ra), and be negative 
either just to the left or just to the right of £(m). Therefore if we choose x small 
enough, /(V ) will reach zero. Furthermore, we have
f(V )  > f(V )
for V  < 77(771), and so the new choice of default boundary increases the share price 
on this range. Figure 5-5 illustrates this for a function f(V )  with positive gradient at 
£(m).
We conclude that if S(m , V) does not smooth paste to zero at V = £(771) it corresponds 
to a suboptimal choice of £(m). If S(m ,V ) does smooth paste to zero at V  =  £ ( 771) 
then any different choice of £ (m ) will decrease the share price. Similar arguments can 
be used to justify the other smooth pasting conditions we have used.
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5.5 Param eter reduction
There is a certain amount of redundancy in the parameters that we have used. Consider 
(5.1), which gives the dynamics of the firm value process V*. As
VXaWt =d oW\t
for A > 0 (where =d denotes equality in distribution), we see that multiplying the 
volatility a  of the firm value process by y/X and multiplying r and S by A can be 
thought of as speeding up the firm value process by a factor of A. Suppose also that 
we multiply the rates at which the firm pays out coupons by the same factor. The 
net effect of these changes would be the same as that of scaling time. As our model 
does not depend explicitly on time, we would not have changed the solution. Thus 
the default and conversion boundaries would remain unchanged. Changing notation 
slightly to express the dependence of the share price and bond price on some of the 
other parameters in the model, we obtain the following relationships:
S(p,r,S,(T]m,V) = S(Xp,Xr ,XS,y /Xa;m,V)  
B(p ,r ,5 ,a- ,m ,V)  = B(Xp,Xr,X6,y/Xcr;m,V).
Secondly, suppose that the process V* describes the firm value for each of p. identical 
firms, each as described in the model, and each with the same number of outstanding 
convertible bonds. The pattern of behaviour in each of these firms will be the same — 
if bonds are converted in one firm, the same will happen in each of the others. Now 
suppose that the p  firms are considered as one. This combined firm fits into the model 
that we have used. The total number of shares and bonds in the combined firm is /in, 
the state of the system can be described by (p m : pV)  and the final pe bonds must be 
converted together. The holder of a bond or share in one of the p  firms can be thought 
of as the holder of a bond or a share respectively in the combined firm, and the price of 
the assets will not have changed. Therefore, again using different notation to emphasise 
the dependence of the prices on the parameters of interest, we deduce that
S (n ,E \m ,V )  =  S (p n ,p e ] p m ,p V )  
B ( n , e ’, m , V )  = B(pn ,p£ ' ,pm ,pV )
The default and conversion boundaries will be scaled by /i, as we would expect.
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Finally, suppose that the coupon rate and firm value process are both multiplied by 
is. This also has the effect of increasing the dividend rate by a factor of is. This 
transformation is equivalent to changing the units of currency being used (at a fixed 
rate of exchange) and so has no fundamental effect on the solution. The boundaries, 
measured in the new currency, will change by a factor of v and the share and bond 
prices will both increase by the same factor. Thus
The solution that we have consists of share and bond price functions, together with 
policies concerning default and conversion. From the specification of the model, it is 
clear that e /n  is a fundamental parameter of the model. We have found that the share 
price and bond price depend upon the parameters a  and /?, which are themselves defined
in this quadratic, the solution fundamentally depends on both of these parameters. 
Therefore no further parameter reduction is possible.
5.6 Num erical examples
In this section we choose two sets of parameter values and compute the solution in 
each case. We take n =  1 in both examples — as discussed in section 5.5 this does not 
result in any loss of generality.
S(p',m ,V) =  — S(isp’,m , isV)  
B(p-,m,V) =  —B(isp;m,isV).
Combining these three identities yields
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Figure 5-6: The conversion boundary (upper curve) and default boundary (lower curve). 
E xam p le  1
Figure 5-6 shows the default and conversion boundaries for the following parameter 
values:
n =  l, e =  1/800, p =  5%, r = 4%,
5 = 2%, <7 =  10%, p =  0.2, r  =  0.5.
From these parameter values we calculate that
a  =  4.70, /3 =  1.70.
In this example the functions S(e, V)  and B(e,  V)  look like those in figure 5-2 rather 
than figure 5-3, that is the share price exceeds the bond price close to r)(e). We find 
that
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e = 0.001250, 77(e) = 3.031738,
m* = 0.002499, 77(771*) = 3.027951.
We see that m* is roughly twice e, and the jump in the conversion boundary is less 
than 0.2%.
In order to see how significant the choice of e is, I repeated the calculation four further 
times. All parameters except e were unchanged, and e took the values 1/400, 1/200, 
1/100, and 1/50. In each case m* was roughly double e. The curves of the boundaries 
that these calculations produce are so similar that a graph is not useful. For example, 
the largest difference between any two corresponding values of £(ra) or 77(771) was less 
than 0.01%.
Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show how the share price and the bond price vary with V  for five 
different values of m. For low values of V  the share price is decreasing in 771, and for 
large values of V  it is increasing in m. This is perhaps not surprising as the dividend 
rate exhibits the same behaviour:
SV -  npf 
(n — 771)2 '
The value of a perpetual risk-free bond paying coupon p is p fr  which is 1.25 in this 
example. For large values of V  there is a high probability that a bond will be converted 
and the probability of default is low. The bond price is therefore close to that of the 
share, as the graphs show. As V  decreases the curves seem to flatten with the bond 
value close to 1.25, particularly when m  is low. Then as V  decreases further, the price 
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Figure 5-7: Share price as a function of firm value. The five curves correspond to 





Figure 5-8: Bond price as a function of firm value. The five curves correspond to 






0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5
m
0.6 0.8 0.90.3 0.7
Figure 5-9: The conversion boundary (upper curve) and default boundary (lower curve). 
E x a m p le  2
The parameters for this example axe
n =  1, e =  l/800, p = 7%, r  =  3%,
6 = 7%, a  =  30%, p =  0.5, r  =  0.1.
From these parameter values we calculate that
a  =  0.304, P =  2.19.
Figure 5-9 shows the default and conversion boundaries. Again, the functions S(e, V) 
and B (e,V ) look like those in figure 5-2 rather than figure 5-3, as the values below 
indicate.
£ =  0.001250, 71(e) =  3.986529,
m* = 0.001264, 77(771*) = 3.984980.
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Here m* is only one percent greater than s. In the first example, rj(m) appeared to 
fall away from r](e) linearly. In this example f]{m) falls away at a faster rate. As with 
the first example, altering the value of e within reasonable bounds does not make a 
significant difference to the boundaries.
Figures 5-10 and 5-11 show how the share price and bond price vary with V. A 
difference between this example and example 1 is that for the five values of m  plotted, 
the share price appears not to exceed V/n. A reason for this could be that the tax 
rebate to the firm is significantly less here. The flattening of the bond prices is less 
pronounced in this example.
Now we attempt to understand how the default and conversion boundaries behave when 
m  is close to n. When m = n — x  the dividend rate is
SV — (n — x)p ' 
x
For small enough x, this expression will be large in magnitude, with sign depending on 
whether
SV -  up'
is negative or not. With a large negative dividend we would expect the firm to default. 
With a large positive dividend we would expect the optimal policy for the bondholders 
to be to convert — the dividend rate will greatly exceed the coupon rate. Therefore 
we expect that both the default boundary and the conversion boundary will be close 
to np1 /8, whilst still satisfying the inequalities in (5.3) and (5.38). This is consistent 
with the behaviour that we see in the numerical examples.
5.7 Discussion
In this section I attempt to explain some of the modelling choices that I have made in 
this chapter. The reason why it is specified that the last e bonds are converted together 
may not be clear. Removing this constraint would lead us to look for a solution using 
the methods of lemma 5.4 for all m. In particular, we might hope to be able to solve 
a differential equation for the default and conversion boundaries for all m. The initial 
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Figure 5-10: Share price as a function of firm value. The five curves correspond to 
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Figure 5-11: Bond price as a function of firm value. The five curves correspond to 
m  =  0.1, m  = 0.3, m  = 0.5, m  = 0.7 and m = 0.9.
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ra =  0, that is, by £(0) =  0. The difficulty with this method lies with this initial 
condition. It turns out that the differential equation has a singularity at m  =  0 and so 
the existence and uniqueness of a solution do not follow easily.
Having found these difficulties with the approach with a continuous process mt, a 
natural next step would be to completely discretise the problem with respect to m*. 
We would specify that bonds and shares could only be owned and converted in integer 
multiples of e for some small e. The process mt would then be an integer multiple of e 
at all times. In appendix C we look at this version of the problem in more detail. Minor 
changes are needed to the definitions of S  and B  as the domain of these functions has 
changed. For example the definition of S(m , V) above the conversion boundary would 
be
S (m ,V ) — S(m  — e ,V ) for V  > 77(771).
The values of £(e) and 77(e) can be found exactly as in lemma 5.2. The most significant 
difference in the solution is that the evolution of the default and conversion boundaries
can no longer given in terms of a differential equation. We find instead that the
conversion boundary 77(771) for m > 2e is a root of the equation
Y ( m - e ,V )  = 0 (5.41)
on the interval V  G [£(771 — s ) ,77(771 — e)]. (One root is always given by V = 77(771 — e).) 
This is similar to the way in which we found 77(771) on the interval m  G (e,77i*] from 
the function V  >-»■ Y{e, V) in section 5.3. We can therefore build the conversion and 
default boundaries iteratively.
The condition corresponding to (P8) becomes
S(m  — £,V) < B (m ,V )  for V  G (£(m),77(771)). (5.42)
Intuitively this condition states that a bondholder who converts before V  reaches the 
conversion boundary cannot increase the net value of his future cashflows. A difficulty 
with the completely discretised version of the problem comes from this condition. It 
is difficult to prove that this inequality holds. One reason for this is that it is hard to 
obtain information about the roots to (5.41).
It is also numerically difficult to find solutions to (5.41) and to verify (5.42). For some
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values of m  a root to (5.41) exists on the interval V  £ (£(ra — e),77(771 — e)), for other 
values the only root is V = rj(m — e). Typically the partial derivative
will be close to zero at V  =  77(771 — e) and if a root to (5.41) exists on V £ (£(m — 
e ) ,  77(771 — e)) it is close to 77(777 — e). Repeating numerical examples with varying degrees 
of accuracy showed that the root-finding routines used were not stable.
By construction we have equality in (5.42) when V = T]{m). Verifying (5.42) numer­
ically can be attempted by comparing the left partial derivatives with respect to V  
of each side at V = r}(m). Again, the numerical results that I obtained depended on 
the accuracy to which calculations were performed and were not stable as the accuracy 
increased. We construct the solution iteratively in m  and so any errors will accumulate. 
This is likely to contribute to the effects just discussed.
An advantage of the completely discretised version of the problem over the version 
we have used in this chapter is that by construction we have a decreasing conversion 
boundary. This in part compensates for the difficulties above. The version of the prob­
lem presented in this chapter is in some sense a hybrid of the discrete and continuous 
versions. We use the discrete version of the problem to avoid the difficulties with the 
initial condition for the differential equation, and then revert to the continuous version 
of the problem. The solution on the interval (s, m*] effectively joins these two solutions.
Finally, despite the problems described above, the default and conversion boundaries 
that were numerically calculated in the discrete version of the problem were reasonably 
stable. Even though the values of m  for which a root to (5.41) is found on the interval 
V  € (£(m — e),T}(m — e)) depend on the accuracy used, the values of the boundaries 
varies very little. This is partly because any roots to (5.41) are close to 7/(771 — e ) .  If we 
compare numerically the boundaries obtained in the discrete version of the problem to 
those obtained in section 5.6 we find that the difference is very small.
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5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed a model of a firm with an issue of perpetual convertible 
debt. We have endogenously found the optimal terms under which the firm defaults, 
and the optimal conditions for bondholders to convert.
Each bondholder aims to maximise the value of the cash flow he will receive in the 
future. The cash flow for a bondholder consists of fixed coupon payments whilst the 
firm is solvent, and a one-off terminal payment should the firm default. The cash 
flow for a shareholder consists of a dividend stream at a variable rate whilst the firm 
is solvent, but no payments in the event of default. The dividend rate is positively 
correlated with the value of the firm. Thus if the value of the firm is high enough, a 
share is more attractive than a bond. When the firm value is low, the fixed coupons 
and the payment received in the event of default make a bond more valuable than a 
share. In deciding whether to convert, a bondholder compares these two future cash 
flows.
The management of the firm chooses the timing of default in order to maximise value 
of the future cash flow to the shareholders. The policies of the management of the firm 
and of the bondholders thus depend on how they expect each other to act. We have 
found a Nash equilibrium which gives us optimal behaviour for all agents.
One feature of this Nash equilibrium is that the bondholders do not all convert simul­
taneously. When a bondholder converts, we find that the dividend rate per shareholder 
decreases. By itself, this would have the effect of decreasing the share price. However, 
the total coupon payments also decrease and this has the effect of reducing the likeli­
hood of default. The combination of these changes has no net effect on the share price. 
We also find that the bond price does not change at conversion. However, we often find 
that further immediate conversion would result in a decrease in share price. This is 
because the effect of a further decrease in dividend would not be compensated for fully 
by the decrease in the likelihood of default that would occur. The optimal behaviour in 
this case is for the remaining bondholders to wait for the firm value to increase before 
converting.
We have assumed that the bond holding is diffuse and have not allowed any collabora­
tion amongst the bondholders when m > e. Altering these assumptions would change
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the nature of the optimal behaviour. For example, consider the situation when the firm 
value is very close to the default boundary. Here the bond price will be close to pV/m. 
Should all the bondholders convert, then each would hold a share worth V/n. If m  is 
large enough that
p < m /n
(and the firm value is close enough to the default boundary) then the bondholders 
would all benefit from this behaviour. However, our solution shows that any single 
bondholder would lose out by converting if at least some of the remaining bondholders 
did not also convert. Considering the problem where the bondholders and/or subsets 
of the bondholders can collaborate would be complex.
We have modelled perpetual debt rather than finite maturity debt. As a result, we 
are able to find explicit expressions for the share price and bond price in terms of the 
default and conversion boundaries. These boundaries can be found numerically. In the 
case of finite maturity debt, the share price and bond price would be functions of time 
as well as of the number of remaining convertibles and the firm value. Similarly, the 
default and conversion boundaries would become functions of time and the number of 
remaining bonds. It seems unlikely that there would be explicit expressions for the 
share price and bond price, and so the partial differential equations that arise would 
have to be solved numerically.
The model we have used could be extended to consider callable convertible debt. A 
policy for the management of the firm would then additionally specify the conditions 
under which the firm should call the bonds. For fixed m  the solution would no longer 




Standard barrier option price
The explicit formula for the price of a standard up-and-out barrier option given in 
Conze & Viswanathan (1991) is reproduced below. We use the symbol $  to denoted 
the standard normal distribution function.
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Appendix B
Correlation of g(X, b) and r
In the risk-neutral probability the payoff of a standard barrier option g{X,b) is a 
function of X \  and X^. We will look at E  jexp (^aX\ -f (3Xi +  7 ^ ^  j to assess the 
correlation between g(X , 6) and r.
E
=  E  
= E
exp +  0X t + 7
E exp ( a X i +  (3X~t +  7 - ^
exp(aA’i +  PXi)E exp (T^ )
Xjs, sup X u, j  = 1, — , iV
X jj, sup =  1, — , JV
( j - l )S < u <  jS
Consider the inner expectation in this expression. The Markov property for X t implies 
that, of the conditioning variables, r  depends only on A quijj, sup(j_1^ <tl< jS X u = X f  
and X js■ We can express r, (defined in (2.2)), as
r  =  - lo g  1 /  eXu Xidu j  .
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Hence, translational invariance of the law of X  implies that r  conditioned on 
X i  and Xjs is a function only of X^ — X ^ _ i^  and X i — Xj$. Therefore
a X  i +  f iXi  +exp ^
exp(aXi +  PXfih  ( 7 ; 
exp(aYi +  pYfih  I 7 ; X *
^(j—l)6 Xj  Xjs
Vs ’ Vs
X; -  X(j_i)S Xi — Xjs
V~s Vs
(B.l)
for some function h, and where Y  is defined by
X u 0 < u < (j — 1) 5
Yu =  ^ (j — 1)S < u  < jS
X(j_ i }5 + B$ + X u — Xjs jS < u < 1
B  is a Brownian motion with the same drift and volatility as X  but independent of X . 
So Y  is obtained from X  by replacing the path over the interval [(J — 1) S,jS\ with an 
independent Brownian motion. The expectation in (B.l) splits into a product:
E exp ( a l l  + ? (j—1)5 j5Vs Vs )]
= f?[exp(ar1+/jy'j)]^ h 7; Vs Vs
We would expect the difference between the paths X  and Y  to be small. The difference 
between E  [exp(aXi +  /3Xj:)] and E  [exp(aYi +  /3Yj)] will therefore also be small and 




In this appendix we look at a discrete version of the convertible bonds problem of 
Chapter 5. In Chapter 5 we assumed (at least when m  exceeded e) that there was 
a continuum of infinitesimal bondholders who could not collaborate. We now change 
the model. We suppose that there are a finite number of bondholders each holding 
e units of bonds, and that bonds can only be converted in units of e. We retain the 
assumption that the bonds axe converted sequentially — if several bondholders all wish 
to convert, one is chosen at random and he converts his e bonds. We also retain the 
assumption that the bondholders do not collaborate. It is clear that the process mt 
now takes values in the set U defined by
U =  {je : j  e  N, je  < n } .
The structure of the rest of this appendix is as follows. Conjecture C .l is analogous to 
Theorem 5.1 and claims the existence of a solution to the problem. The functions S  
and B  which will correspond to the share and bond price functions are defined in terms 
of the boundaries f(ra) and r}(m) in definition C.l. There are only minor differences 
from definition 5.1. Finally, Theorem C.l gives sufficient properties of the functions S  
and B  that they form a Nash equilibrium. Theorem C.l is analogous to Theorem 5.2.








(i) 77 is decreasing
in terms of which the optimal policies are
II5: the management of the firm defaults when Vt < £(mt)
IIb; the bondholders convert when Vt > r)(mt).
We now define the functions S  and B  in terms of the default and conversion boundaries.
D efinition C .l .  Given boundaries f  and 77 which satisfy the inequalities (C.l)-(C.S) 
and condition (i) of conjecture C.l, construct S  : U x R+ —»• R by
(S3) V  S (m ,V ) is C 1 at £(to)
and B  :U x  R+ —¥ R by
(B l) B(m , V) = pV /m  for V  < £{m)
(B2) CB  +  p = 0 for V  G [f (to), 77(771)]
(B3) B(m,r](m)) =  S(m,r}(m))
(B4) V  1—y B (m ,V ) is continuous at £(to) and 77(771).
(SI) 5(7n, V) =  0 for V  < £(m)
(S2) CS +  — — =  0 for V  G [£ (to), 77(771)]71 — 771
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Now define £ : [0, t)(e)] —> [e, n] by
C(V) = sup { e < m < n :  r)(m) > V }
and S  and B  by
S(m , V) = S(m  A {(V ),V )  (C.4)
B (m ,V ) = B(m , V) f o r O < V  <r)(m) (C.5)
B (m ,V )  =  — S(m  — e,V ) + —— -B (m  — e,V ) for rj(m) < V  < r)(e). (C.6)m  77i
The function 5(0, V) gives the share price when no bonds remain, so 5(0, V) =  V/n. 
As in chapter 5, we interpret B (0, V) also as the share price when no bonds remain. 
This definition of 5  and B  is very similar to that in definition 5.1. The remarks that 
follow definition 5.1 apply here too. The following theorem is analogous to Theorem 
5.2 and gives sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium.
T heorem  C .l .  Suppose we are given boundaries €(m) and r](m) which satisfy the 
inequalities (C.l)-(C.S) and condition (?) of conjecture C.l. I f  the functions S  and B  
of definition C.l have the property
(P I) ' 5 (771, 77(771)) =  5(771 — £,77(771)) =  B (m  — £,77(777))
then we extend S  and B  continuously to l l  x R+ by
(P2)' B(m, V) =  5 (777, V) =  V /n  for V  > r)(e).
Suppose that the functions S  and B  so extended have the properties
(P3)# V  P(£, V) is C 1 at r){e)
(PA)' B (e ,V ) > V /n
(P5)' 5(7 7 7  — £, V) < B (m , V) for V  < 77(777)
(P6)' B (m  — £, V) < P(777, V) for V  > 77(777)
(P I)' 5 (777, V) > 0
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then S  corresponds to the share price, B  corresponds to the bond price, and the policies 
II5  and IIb are optimal.
Proof of Theorem C.l. This proof is analogous to that of Theorem 5.2. Define the local 
martingale X t by
X t =  e- rtS{mt , Vt) -  f  e~ruCS(m u, Vu)du 
Jo
-  y  e ~ r u  w ™ * ’ v«) -  s (m u - ’ •
0 < u < t
For any stopping time T  that reduces X  we have
Xo =  S{m0,V0) = E[Xt \
= E r rTS(m T,VT) -  [  e~ruCS(m u, Vu)du 
Jo
-  Y  <rru {S{mu,Vu) -  S(mu- , v u-)}
0 < u < T
Now under II# conversion occurs only when V  > r)(m). Hence from (C.4), (PI)’ and 
(P2)' we see that S  does not change at conversion. Therefore
S(rao,Vo) =  E
r T
i rTS(m T,Vr) — /  e ruCS(m u,Vu)du 
Jo
The same argument that was used in the proof of Theorem 5.2 shows that
(i) 5(mo, Vb) is an upper bound for the net present value of the future cashflows 
from a share,
(ii) Under n^ , 5 (mo, Vo) equals the net present value of the future cashflows from a 
share.
Therefore 5(m, V) is the share price. We do not repeat the details of this argument.
Now let T  denote the time at which the management of the firm defaults. We assume
that the management of the firm follows n 5 , all bondholders follow n #, and Vq <
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r)(mo). We consider the last bondholder to convert. Define the local martingale Zt by
pZf \ l
Zt = e - r(-tAT^B(mtAf ,V tA t) -  e~ru C B(m u,Vu)du 
Jo 
-  Y ,  e~ru {B(mu,Vu) -  B { m u- , v u- ) } .
0 < u < tA T
If T  reduces Z  we obtain
Zq =  B(mo , Vft) =  E[Zt \ 
= E
"TAT
(TAr)s (m TAr,FTAT)- /  e~ruCB(m u, Vu)du 
Jo
-  Y  e~ru K.) -  S(ro„_, K.-)}
0 < u < T  AT
Conversion will occur when Vt =  i](mt) and thus (B3)' and (P I /  show that B  does not 
change at conversion. Therefore
B{m 0,Vo) =  E
pT A T
’(r*r)B{mTAT,VTAT) -  /  e~TUC B(m u,Vu)du 
Jo
Again, it follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 5.2 that B(mo,Vo) is the bond 
price.
Next consider a bondholder who converts before m  =  e under II#. Properties (B3J 
and (P I /  show that the net present value of his future cashflows when he converts does 
not change. Thus Vo) also defines the net time-0 value of his cashflow.
If Vo > 77(mo) then under II# bonds axe converted immediately. Each bondholder will 
attempt to convert; with probability e/m  a specific bondholder will be the one chosen 
to convert, with probability (m — e)/m  he will remain a bondholder. Thus (C.6) shows 
that B (m , V) corresponds to the bond price.
We now show the suboptimality of alternative policies. If a bondholder chooses to 
convert when Vt < 77(772*) then he is swapping from the cashflow associated with a 
bond to that associated with a share. Property (P 5/ shows that the net present value 
of his future cashflows decreases. Thus his behaviour is suboptimal.
I l l
The other way in which a bondholder could change policy is by not attempting to 
convert when V > r}(m). If m = e then the proof that this strategy is suboptimal 
follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. If m  > e then the other bondholders will 
attempt to convert. It follows from (P6)' that this alternative policy for the bondholder 
is suboptimal. □
We have conjectured that a solution exists. We now outline a method for finding this 
solution. First observe that £(e) and 77(e) can be constructed as described in lemma 
5.2. It is therefore sufficient to describe how to obtain the boundaries €(m) and 77(771) 
from £(771 — e) and 77(777, — e). Recall the definition of Y :
Y ( m , V ) =  S(m ,V ) -  B (m ,V ).
From property (PI)' we deduce that 77(771) is a root of
Y ( m - e , V )  =  0. (C.7)
Condition (z) of conjecture C.l states that 77(771) < 77(771 — e). Furthermore, property 
(B3)' implies that 77(771 — e) is a root of (C.7). As Y (m  — e,€(m  — e)) is negative 
it follows from lemma 5.1 that there is at most one root to (C.7) on the interval 
(£(m — £)ir}{7n ~ £))- We define 77(771) to be this root if it exists, otherwise we choose 
77(771) =  77(771 — e). The value of £(771) is then chosen so that V S ( m , V") is continuous 
at 77(771). It is possible to prove (P7)' in a similar way that the corresponding condition 
was proved in section 5.3. It is also possible to prove (P6)'. However, conjecture C.l 
remains a conjecture owing to the difficulty in proving (P5)'. This, and the difficulties 
in verifying (P5)' numerically, are discussed in section 5.7.
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